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Summary Table 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -1.2 -1.2 -0.8 1.5 2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure -2.1 -2.1 1.4 -0.5 -1.0 
Investment -2.9 5.0 -2.4 8.1 8.9 
Exports 5.5 4.7 1.1 3.5 4.0 
Imports -0.6 6.9 0.6 3.0 3.3 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2.8 -0.3 0.2 3.0 3.7 
Gross National Product (GNP) -0.8 1.9 3.2 3.4 3.8 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
    
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2.6 1.7 0.5 0.3 1.0 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 1.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Labour Market 
    
 
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,849 1,838 1,881 1,921 1,973 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 317 316 282 249 215 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 14.6 14.7 13.1 11.5 9.8 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Public Finance* 
    
 
General Government Balance (€ bn) -21.9 -14.3 -12.2 -7.4 -4.7 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -12.8 -8.3 -7.0 -4.1 -2.5 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 99.0 111.4 116.1 115.6 109.6 
 
    
 
  
    
 
External Trade 
    
 
Balance of Payments Current Account (€ bn) 1.4 2.7 7.6 9.1 11.2 
Current Account (% of GNP) 1.0 1.9 5.1 5.9 6.9 
 
    
 
 
    
 
Demand 
    
 
Final Demand 2.7 2.4 0.5 3.1 3.6 
Domestic Demand -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 2.4 2.9 
Domestic Demand (excl. Stocks) -1.7 -0.2 -0.7 2.4 2.8 
* Our public finance numbers do not take account of the latest revisions published by the CSO. 
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Summary 
The release of the first set of macroeconomic estimates of the economy for 2014 
confirms the relatively strong recovery in output envisaged for this year in earlier 
Commentaries. Estimates released by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) suggest 
that for Q1 2014 GDP is up 2.7 per cent on the previous quarter and 4.1 per cent 
year-on-year. These estimates also contain a significant upward revision of the 
quarterly growth rate for Q4 2014 from -2.4 to-0.1 per cent. 
 
These trends, along with the observed growth in key domestic demand 
indicators, strong export performance and better than expected budgetary 
returns result in growth forecasts for GNP of 3.4 per cent in 2014 and 3.8 per cent 
in 2015. Given the difficulties associated with the measurement of GDP at 
present in an Irish context, we maintain GNP as our output point of reference. 
Accordingly, we expect further declines in unemployment through 2014, with the 
headline rate predicted to fall to 9.8 per cent in 2015.  
 
To enhance our understanding of developments in the real economy, the 
forecasting approach adopted in the Commentary is now supplemented by the 
increasingly popular “Nowcasting” methodology. This provides a timelier 
estimate of what the growth rate within the economy is at present. 
 
Notwithstanding the encouraging performance of the economy, we note certain 
issues which may impede the consolidation of the recovery. The weak growth 
prospects for the euro zone are a distinct concern; recent policy measures 
announced by the European Central Bank (ECB) are unlikely to provide the 
requisite stimulus necessary for a more significant rate of output growth. Given 
the high levels of debt observed in Europe, it is essential that policies aimed at 
increasing output growth become more central to decision-making at the Euro 
Area level. 
 
Additionally, an increasing amount of domestic micro-level research highlights 
the negative effect of ongoing difficulties in the Irish financial sector on 
investment and consumption.  The need for domestic financial institutions to 
repair impaired balance sheets, and the resulting pressures to deleverage, appear 
to be constraining the amount of finance available for the real economy.  
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In general, given the particularly low rate of investment, the high rate of 
unemployment and the weak levels of credit being extended, we believe the Irish 
economy is still somewhat below its potential level. 
 
Some of these issues are especially pertinent to the domestic housing market. 
The present Commentary devotes a substantial amount of attention to the 
residential sector, with a special article and a number of notes on various housing 
issues. Our main conclusion is that despite the strong increases in house prices 
observed of late, particularly in the Dublin area, nationally house prices still 
appear to be undervalued in the Irish market. At present, there is no sign of a 
“bubble” in the domestic market and any recovery occurring at this point is 
almost a “credit-less” one. In the absence of a significant increase in supply, we 
expect house prices to increase by up to 7.5 per cent per annum in nominal terms 
over the period 2014 to 2017. 
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National Accounts 2013 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 82.5 83.3 1.1 1.9 -0.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.9 26.0 0.1 -1.2 1.4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 26.9 26.5 -1.4 1.0 -2.4 
Exports of Goods and Services 182.5 184.1 0.8 -0.3 1.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.3 0.8 
   Final Demand 318.1 320.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 
less: 
     Imports of Goods and Services (M) 147.1 147.7 0.4 -0.2 0.6 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.7 1.8 
   GDP at Market Prices 172.8 174.8 1.2 1.0 0.2 
Net Factor Payments (F) -30.3 -26.3 
   GNP at Market Prices 142.4 148.5 4.3 1.1 3.2 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.3 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 69.5 71.9 2.3 3.4 
Other 63.7 61.1 -2.6 -4.1 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.1 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.7 -1.8 
  Net Domestic Product 134.5 134.8 0.4 0.3 
Net Factor Payments -30.3 -26.3 4.0 -13.4 
National Income 104.1 108.6 4.4 4.2 
Depreciation 23.0 23.7 0.6 2.6 
GNP at Factor Cost 127.2 132.2 5.0 3.9 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.2 16.3 1.1 7.0 
GNP at Market Prices 142.4 148.5 6.1 4.3 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 35.4 36.3 0.9 
F -30.3 -26.3 4.0 
Net Transfers -2.4 -2.5 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 2.7 7.6 4.9 
as % of GNP 1.9 5.1 3.3 
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National Accounts 2014 
 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 83.3 85.0 2.0 0.5 1.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.0 25.9 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 26.5 29.4 10.9 2.6 8.1 
Exports of Goods and Services 184.1 191.8 4.2 0.6 3.5 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.8 0.8 
   Final Demand 320.7 332.9 3.8 0.7 3.1 
less: 
     Imports of Goods and Services (M) 147.7 153.6 4.0 0.9 3.0 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.8 1.8 
   GDP at Market Prices 174.8 181.1 3.6 0.6 3.0 
Net Factor Payments (F) -26.3 -26.6 
   GNP at Market Prices 148.5 154.5  4.0 0.6 3.4 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.1 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 71.9 74.2 2.3 3.2 
Other 61.1 63.3 2.2 3.6 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.8 -1.8 
  Net Domestic Product 134.8 139.4 4.6 3.4 
Net Factor Payments -26.3 -26.6 -0.4 1.4 
National Income 108.6 112.7 4.2 3.8 
Depreciation 23.7 24.0 0.3 1.4 
GNP at Factor Cost 132.2 136.7 4.5 3.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.3 17.8 1.5 8.9 
GNP at Market Prices 148.5 154.5 6.0 4.0 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 36.3 38.2 1.9 
F -26.3 -26.6 -0.4 
Net Transfers -2.5 -2.5 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 7.6 9.1 1.5 
as % of GNP 5.1 5.9 1.0 
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National Accounts 2015 
 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 85.0 87.6 3.0 1.0 2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.9 25.0 -3.3 -2.4 -1.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 29.4 32.9 11.7 2.6 8.9 
Exports of Goods and Services 191.8 201.6 5.1 1.1 4.0 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.8 1.0 
   Final Demand 332.9 348.1 4.6 1.0 3.6 
less: 
     Imports of Goods and Services (M) 153.6 160.2 4.3 1.0 3.3 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.8 1.8 
   GDP at Market Prices 181.1 189.7 4.7 1.0 3.7 
Net Factor Payments (F) -26.6 -27.9 
   GNP at Market Prices 154.5 161.8 4.7 0.9 3.8 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.1 3.2 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 74.2 77.3 3.1 4.2 
Other 63.3 67.4 4.0 6.4 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.8 -1.8 
  Net Domestic Product 139.4 146.6 7.3 5.2 
Net Factor Payments -26.6 -27.9 -1.2 4.5 
National Income 112.7 118.8 6.0 5.4 
Depreciation 24.0 24.5 0.5 2.1 
GNP at Factor Cost 136.7 143.3 6.5 4.8 
Taxes less Subsidies 17.8 18.5 0.8 4.4 
GNP at Market Prices 154.5 161.8 7.3 4.7 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 38.2 41.5 3.2 
F -26.6 -27.9 -1.2 
Net Transfers -2.5 -2.5 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 9.1 11.2 2.0 
as % of GNP 5.9 6.9 1.3 
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1 
 
The International Economy 
 
The outlook for Ireland’s main trading partners is somewhat mixed through 2014 
and 2015. While the United States economy has been somewhat weaker than 
expected in the first half of 2014, growth of 2.5 per cent is forecast for 2014 with 
a forecast of 3.1 per cent for 2015. The recovery in the United Kingdom is 
expected to continue, with growth of 3.0 and 2.5 per cent forecast for 2014 and 
2015 respectively. By contrast, the median growth forecasts for the Euro Area are 
quite modest at 1.1 and 1.5 per cent growth. As shown in Figure 1, there is 
considerable variation in forecasts for countries in the Euro Area with the 
outcomes for its individual members quite diverse. Legacy issues from the 
financial crisis, in particular ongoing difficulties in the banking sector, are some of 
the main reasons for the low growth outlook within the Euro Area. This is 
reflected in the low investment rates observed across many European countries. 
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% change, year-on-year)
 
                    Euro Area                    United States                  United Kingdom 
       
 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
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The Euro Area Economy 
Real GDP in the Euro Area grew by 0.2 per cent quarter-on-quarter and 0.9 per 
cent year-on-year in Q1 of 2014. While this represents an improvement on 
previous quarters’ growth rates, Euro Area growth remains weak with a 
somewhat uncertain outlook over the medium term. A number of studies have 
highlighted the prospect of modest longer-term European growth rates in the 
absence of significant policy initiatives or reforms, for example in product and 
labour markets. There is also a striking variation in output growth rates across 
Member States, with 11 of 18 States having quarter-on-quarter GDP growth in 
Q1. The Netherlands had the greatest fall at 1.4 per cent, while Ireland had the 
largest increase at 2.7 per cent. Employment in the Euro Area rose by 0.2 per cent 
year-on-year in Q1. 
 
Annual inflation in the Euro Area, as measured by the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices, remained stable at 0.5 per cent in June. Core inflation, excluding 
energy, food, alcohol and tobacco, rose from 0.7 per cent to 0.8 per cent. 
Following previous months of significant falling prices, which contributed to 
Europe’s low inflation, energy prices remained stable in May and rose by 0.1 per 
cent in June. 
 
In response to the low level of economic activity, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), at its June meeting, announced a package of new measures including: a cut 
in its main refinancing rate to 0.15 per cent, the introduction of a negative 
deposit rate of -0.1 per cent and preparatory work for a programme to purchase 
securitised SME loans. In addition, a new Targeted Long-Term Refinancing 
Operation (TLTRO) was announced, a counterpart to the Bank of England’s 
Funding for Lending (FLS) scheme. The introduction of the €400 billion TLTRO, 
aimed at stimulating lending by banks to SMEs, has been prompted by the 
ongoing contraction in supply and demand for credit in the Euro Area. Loans to 
the private sector fell by 1.8 per cent in April, having fallen by 2.2 per cent in 
March. While packages to increase lending to the real economy are welcome, the 
adoption of lending targets such as those schemes undertaken in Ireland and the 
UK have not proven to be that successful. In particular, issues can arise with the 
definition of what constitutes “new lending” by financial institutions. 
 
The ECB’s latest measures also do not directly address the problem of low 
inflation in the Euro Area. The ECB projects that it will only be able to fulfil its 
mandate of just-under 2 per cent inflation by late-2016 at the earliest. Given this, 
it is more than likely that a more expansive policy response is required to achieve 
both its inflation target and greater rates of output growth. The implementation 
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of a full Quantitative Easing Programme would, through its influence on foreign 
exchange rates, benefit exporters in the Euro Area while also helping to return 
inflation to target through higher import prices. The President of the ECB, Mario 
Draghi, has highlighted the risk that an appreciated exchange rate poses to the 
sustainability of recovery in the Euro Area, and indeed we forecast the Euro’s 
exchange rates with both the Dollar and Pound to remain appreciated 
throughout 2014 and 2015. An alternative plan for raising output growth is 
proposed by McQuinn and Whelan (2013),1 who argue for a large Euro Area-wide 
investment programme aimed at reducing unemployment and raising the supply 
capacity of the European economy. This investment could be funded by the Euro 
Area as a whole.  
 
The US Economy 
Real GDP in the United States fell at an annual rate of 2.9 per cent in Q1 of 2014, 
revised from the second estimate of a 1 per cent fall.  Estimates of investment 
were particularly affected by revisions, while falling exports and rising imports 
also contributed to lower GDP growth. This weak start to 2014 has prompted cuts 
to the forecast growth rate for the US in 2014, although the US economy is still 
expected to grow at a faster rate than in 2013. 
 
The Labor Department’s Non-Farm Payrolls survey showed average monthly job 
creation of 272,000 in the second quarter, significantly higher figures than in the 
final months of 2013 and during the start of 2014. While the strength of these job 
creation figures can in large part be attributed to seasonal factors, there was a 
fall in the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate of 0.2 percentage points to 6.1 
per cent in June, down from annual averages of 8.1 per cent and 7.4 per cent in 
2012 and 2013 respectively. In addition, in May the total number of employed 
persons exceeded its pre-crisis peak for the first time.  
 
As noted in the last Commentary, however, the current strength of the US labour 
market can be overstated. The labour force participation rate fell by 0.7 
percentage points in the year to June, contributing to the improvement in the 
headline unemployment figure. At 62.8 per cent, this participation rate is the 
lowest observed in the US market since March 1978. Additionally, long-term 
unemployment remains high and the employment-population ratio was 
unchanged in the last year. 
 
                                                            
1  McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2013). “Europe’s growth crisis”, paper presented to the CEPR-Modena conference on 
‘Growth in Mature Economies’, 7-8 November, Modena, Italy. 
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At its June meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee announced a further 
cut of $10 billion from its monthly asset purchase programme. The Fed now 
purchases $35 billion in bonds and mortgage-backed securities per month, down 
from a peak of $85 billion. While Federal Reserve Chair, Janet Yellen pointed to 
“significant underlying strength” in the US economy, the Fed cut its growth 
forecast for real GDP from between 2.8 and 3 per cent to between 2.1 and 2.3 
per cent.   
 
The UK Economy 
The United Kingdom economy grew by 1.7 per cent in volume terms in 2013, with 
GDP growth in each quarter for the first time since the financial crisis. Growth 
continued in the first quarter of 2014, with real GDP rising by 0.8 per cent. Figure 
2 shows the paths of GDP output components, indexed to the pre-recession peak. 
Only the services sector has exceeded that peak, with industrial production, 
construction and agriculture still lagging behind. Industrial production grew in 
each of the last four quarters (by 2.4 per cent in total), with manufacturing, in 
particular, contributing strongly. With the exception of agriculture, all main GDP 
output components have shown growth thus far in 2014, suggesting a certain 
consolidation in the recovery. Estimates from the National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research (NIESR) suggest that, after 25 quarters, the UK economy 
exceeded its pre-recession peak in Quarter 2. Given that only the services sector 
has exceeded its pre-crisis level, this illustrates the extent to which UK economic 
activity is dominated by this sector. 
 
FIGURE 2 GDP Output Components Growth (% change, Quarter-on-Quarter)
 
 
Sources:  Office for National Statistics, Quarterly National Accounts. 
Note:  2008=100, chained volume measure seasonally adjusted. 
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The UK labour market has continued its recovery in the first half of 2014, with the 
unemployment rate falling to 6.5 per cent in Q2, compared with 6.9 per cent in 
the previous quarter and 7.8 per cent a year earlier. The inactivity rate fell from 
22.5 per cent to 21.7 per cent over the year, representing the lowest rate in the 
UK market since 1990. The percentage of the working-age population in 
employment now stands at 73.1 per cent, the highest level since Q4 2004.  
 
It is likely that there is still significant spare capacity in the UK’s labour market 
despite improvements in headline numbers. While the labour market is 
recovering in terms of job creation, growth in wages and productivity remain 
weak. Year-on-year, pay excluding bonuses grew by 0.7 per cent in Q2, while the 
Consumer Price Index rose by 1.9 per cent in June. The current period of falling 
real wages in the UK is the longest in duration since the 1920s. Meanwhile, total 
hours grew by 1.5 per cent in Q1, outstripping growth in output and thereby 
implying negative productivity growth. 
 
The Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) House Price Index showed that house 
prices rose by 10.5 per cent in the year to May, with a particularly strong increase 
of 20.1 per cent rise in the London market. The existence of a potential property 
bubble in the UK has been the cause of much debate in the UK and 
internationally, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in particular, 
highlighting the risk developments in the housing market pose to the general 
economy. The lack of supply of new housing plays a significant role in the price 
increases, while the Help to Buy scheme, which subsidises mortgages to first-time 
buyers, has almost certainly fuelled demand-side pressures. Given recent 
statements concerning the dangers of an overheating property market by the 
Bank of England, the adoption of this scheme by Her Majesty’s Treasury 
highlights a degree of policy incoherence in the UK concerning housing market 
developments. 
 
The World Economy 
The latest Global Economic Forecast from NIESR predicts growth in the world 
economy of 3.6 per cent in 2014 and 3.9 per cent in 2015. While this represents 
faster growth than in 2013, NIESR emphasises the split between growth in 
advanced economies and in emerging markets. China, Brazil and Russia face 
slower growth while prospects for growth are improving in advanced economies. 
Japan remains an exception among the advanced economies, with growth 
slowing once more. The Bank of Japan may thus opt to make its monetary policy 
more accommodative, while the scope for the same policy action may be limited 
in some emerging market economies due to the presence of high inflation. NIESR 
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also highlights potential risks to the global economy stemming from the 
unwinding of Quantitative Easing Programmes, particularly that of the United 
States. 
 
The Ukrainian crisis continues to have a significant impact on both the Ukrainian 
and Russian economies. The Bank of Russia has cut its GDP growth forecast for 
2014 to 0.5 per cent while raising its main interest rate further to 7.5 per cent. 
The Russian economy had already been weak before the crisis and the 
international response to the Ukrainian situation will have compounded these 
difficulties. From a wider European perspective, a major escalation in the crisis 
would almost inevitably lead to difficulties in European energy supply as 12 
European Union states receive more than half of their natural gas from Russia, 
with four states entirely dependent on the Russian market. 
 
The growth in non-OPEC supply of oil, particularly production in the United 
States, has contributed to falling volatility in oil prices. The growth in this supply 
helps to offset the impact of production interruptions in the Middle East, which 
have taken place in Libya and may potentially occur in Iraq as a result of new 
geopolitical tensions. However, the IMF and the Energy Information 
Administration forecast oil prices to fall in the medium term, particularly due to 
increasing supply from non-OPEC states. 
 
Summary 
The external economy continues to improve and is more favourable for Ireland 
than in recent years. We note, however, that there are caveats to the recent 
economic performances of some of Ireland’s main trading partners; the US, UK 
and Euro Area. The Euro Area in particular faces significant issues in achieving a 
more sustainable output growth and inflation outlook. Given the openness of the 
Irish economy, the response of policy to these issues is of the utmost importance. 
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2 
Growth and Output 
 
In early July the Central Statistics Office (CSO) published the detailed National 
Accounts for 2013 and previous years. This publication included a major revision 
to the system of National Accounts which affected the level of GNP and GDP back 
to 1995. Primarily because of the inclusion of expenditure on R&D as part of 
investment, the level of GDP for 2013 was raised by 6.5 per cent. A similar large 
upward adjustment occurred in the figure for GNP. While these are very large 
adjustments in the numbers, they did not, on their own, result in a major change 
to the historical growth rates. However, a wide range of other revisions, 
consequent on new and more up to date data, did change the growth rates for 
past years compared to the preliminary figures published in March. 
 
While the data for 2012 and 2013 have been revised, the published figures for 
GDP are still very much affected by unusual developments affecting multinational 
companies operating in Ireland. These problems, and their implications for the 
national accounts, are discussed in Box 1.  
 
FIGURE 3 GDP and GNP Growth Rates, 2000-2015
 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office. 
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The combination of these different national accounting problems, affecting 
sectors of the economy dominated by multinationals, makes GDP a very 
unreliable indicator of the change in the economic welfare of the Irish population. 
Thus, when trying to understand underlying movements in real income in Ireland 
in 2013, 2014 and 2015, it is the trend in GNP rather than GDP which warrants 
greater attention.  The growth rate of GNP in 2013 was 3.2 per cent, up from 1.9 
per cent in 2012 (Figure 3).  For this year and next year we see growth continuing 
at a similar rate to 2013, with GNP forecast to grow by 3.4 per cent in 2014 and 
3.8 per cent in 2015. (We also show the growth rate of GNP adjusted for 
redomiciled PLCs. This makes a difference for the period 2009-2012.) For GDP the 
outlook is much more uncertain because so much depends on the accounting 
practises of multinational firms rather than real economic activity, such as 
employment. On the assumption that some of the national accounting 
complications experienced in 2012 and 2013 are now behind us, we forecast that 
GDP will grow at a rather similar rate to GNP, by 3.0 per cent in 2014 and by 3.7 
per cent in 2015.  
 
This shows a reasonably robust recovery from the nadir of 2011 when GNP, 
adjusting for the profits of redomiciled PLCs, was 14 per cent below its peak in 
2007. However, it will still leave the level of real GNP in 2015 well below its peak 
level in 2007. Also, with the growth in the population in the meantime, GNP per 
head has fallen even further. 
 
Because GDP is the measure conventionally used when comparing economic 
growth across countries, what is a domestic success story may appear to much of 
the outside world as continued economic stagnation. The arcane issues 
underlying developments in the economy are difficult to explain to an 
international audience. 
 
These unusual national accounting developments have a major impact on 
sectoral GDP on the output side of the national accounts, and also on exports and 
factor flows on the expenditure side of the accounts. This makes the short-term 
indicators used for forecasting trade and output particularly unreliable. To 
understand what is really going on in the economy we need indicators of the 
contribution of each sector to GNP. For Irish owned firms the contribution to GNP 
is equivalent to their gross value added. However, for foreign owned firms the 
contribution is confined to their wage bill and the corporation tax paid on their 
profits.  
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As we have outlined, the particular uncertainty associated with the GDP forecast 
must be emphasised. Depending on the accounting behaviour of relatively few 
multinational firms the growth in GDP could prove to be much lower than we are 
forecasting. Thus, the margin of error around our GDP forecast for 2014 could be 
much greater than that for our GNP forecast.  
 
Given the difficulties associated with assessing movements in GDP, in Box 2 we 
outline a new forecasting methodology (nowcasting) which will now complement 
the traditional approach used in the Commentary. This will help to provide a 
timelier estimate of output growth in the economy using a large amount of 
information. 
 
Box 1: Problems in Interpreting the National Accounts 
By John FitzGerald 
 
The process of globalisation is making the standard presentation of National 
Accounts more and more difficult to interpret. Because of the nature of its 
integration into the global economy, this particularly affects Ireland. However, it is 
now also affecting the accounts for a number of other EU countries, such as the 
Netherlands and the UK. 
 
As a result of globalisation, the production process for goods and services is being 
gradually broken up into an increasing number of different separate stages or 
components, many of which are produced by firms in differing countries. This helps 
explain how world trade is growing much more rapidly than world GDP – as the 
production process is broken up the value of trade includes both the increasing 
number of inputs into a good or service sold to consumers and also the good or 
service itself. This means that the gross flow of goods and services, measured as 
exports, may be much greater than the value added related to those exports: only a 
small part of the production process is located in an individual country. This makes 
trade and gross output data unreliable indicators of movements in GNP in small 
economies that are highly globalised, such as that of Ireland. 
 
In the case of the Irish national accounts there are a number of important ways that 
this process is affecting the numbers: patent expiry and the Pharmaceutical sector; 
value added in the Software and IT services sector; movement to Ireland of some 
specialised firms operating in the financial sector, referred to as redomiciled PLCs; 
and provision of air transport services. 
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The first of these problem areas involves the Pharmaceutical sector. As discussed in 
two recent papers, the pharmaceutical industry in Ireland is quite large and its gross 
output is large relative to GDP. As a result, the ending of patents on certain drugs 
has had a very large impact on Irish output, exports and GDP. At the same time this 
change has not greatly affected the welfare of people living in Ireland, measured by 
GNP. 2 
 
The second area where a sector’s very large gross output and trade distorts the 
National Accounts is the broad Software and Computer Services sector. In 2013 the 
volume of gross value added (GVA) of the Software and Communication sector fell 
by 11.8 per cent, resulting in a fall of 5.2 in the GVA of the broader Distribution and 
Software sector. However, in the broader distribution sector GVA at current prices 
grew by over 7 per cent. This fall in the volume of GVA combined with the growth in 
GVA at current prices must be seen against the backdrop of a 4 per cent increase in 
the wage bill of the broader distribution sector. There was also a very big increase 
in the profits of that sector of over 10 per cent.  
 
The national accounts provide no clue as to how GVA in volume could fall by so 
much when GVA at current prices actually rose in value. Whatever the explanation, 
this has seriously distorted the GDP figures for 2013. This makes it clear that 
something unusual affected the treatment of the volume of output of the sector in 
2013. The fact that the wage bill, and hence employment, was rising rapidly in the 
sector indicates that the sector made a substantial positive contribution to GNP 
growth in 2013, while making a very substantial negative contribution to GDP in 
that year. Were it not for this fall in the output of the Software and Communication 
sector in 2013, GDP would have risen by 1.2 per cent rather than the actual rise of 
0.2 per cent.  
 
A third area where the national accounts are distorted by the behaviour of large 
foreign owned companies operating in Ireland is the case of so-called “redomiciled 
PLCs”.3 In a note in the Spring 2013 Commentary we discussed the distortion of the 
current account of the balance of payments over the period 2008-2012 due to the 
behaviour of some PLCs that redomiciled to Ireland. These companies, whose 
beneficial owners were resident outside Ireland (generally in the UK), were 
receiving income in Ireland from abroad, which they were not fully remitting to 
                                                            
2  See FitzGerald, J., (2013a). “The Effect on Major Accounting Aggregates of the Ending of Pharmaceutical Patents”, 
ESRI Research Note 2013/2/1, published in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute, and Dalton, M. and S. Enright, (2013). “The Impact of the Patent Cliff on Pharma-Chem 
Output in Ireland”, Working Paper No. 1, 2013. Dublin: The Department of Finance. 
3  See FitzGerald, J., (2013b), "The Effect of Re-domiciled PLCs on Irish Output Measures and the Balance of Payments," 
QEC Research Notes 2013/1/2, published in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute. 
Q u a rte r ly  Econ om ic  C omm en ta ry  –  S um me r  2014 | 11  
 
 
their owners in the UK (or elsewhere): instead they were taking the benefit as a 
capital gain. This added a significant amount to the credit side of the Irish current 
account of the balance of payments and it also added to the value and volume of 
GNP. As this income was not of benefit to people living in Ireland it provided a 
deceptive picture of what was happening to the economy. As a result, with the help 
of the CSO, over the last year we have been publishing figures for the current 
account and for GNP adjusting for these payments. However, as the size of these 
payments has not changed much since 2012, the growth in the current account 
surplus and in GNP in 2013 was not affected by any such distortion. 
 
The fourth area where the National Accounts provide a potentially misleading 
impression of activity in the economy involves transports services. As discussed 
later in this Commentary, Ryanair are planning to acquire a large number of aircraft 
over the next four years to allow them to increase their provision of air transport 
services across Europe. In the National Accounts the import of aircraft is fully offset 
by an increase in investment so that the import of the aircraft does not directly 
affect GDP. However, there is a significant effect on the current account of the 
balance of payments as the imports are not offset by a corresponding export in the 
relevant year. The benefit from this investment, by Ryanair, in new aircraft will 
presumably come in subsequent years as these aircraft are put to profitable use 
around Europe. The increased business activity will result in a continuing higher 
export of transport services from Ireland in future years. This export item will 
include the profits needed to pay for the aircraft over time, as well as some 
additional profit for the shareholders. Thus, the increase in the current account 
deficit in 2013 and 2014 will be offset by higher export of services over the rest of 
the decade. This needs to be taken into account in interpreting movements in the 
balance of payments. 
 
A further complication will arise with the National Accounts for next year. A change 
will be implemented which will alter the treatment of aircraft leasing in the 
National Accounts. Since it is reported that almost 20 per cent of the world’s civil 
aircraft fleet is owned by leasing companies in Ireland,4 this new approach to the 
National Accounts could result in changes to the trade data that would dwarf the 
effects of Ryanair’s purchase of aircraft over the next four years. 
 
Ireland is not alone in facing these problems. A very similar phenomenon to the 
redomiciled PLCs is affecting the Netherlands current account, as UK firms have 
moved headquarters to Amsterdam. This helps explain how the Netherlands is 
currently running a current account surplus of between 9 per cent and 10 per cent 
                                                            
4   http://www.irishaviationresearchinstitute.blogspot.ie/p/ireland-aircraft-leasing-companies.html 
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of GDP. As with the redomiciled PLCs in the Irish current account, a significant part 
of this current account surplus in the Netherlands is of no direct benefit to the 
people of the Netherlands, being properly the income of entities resident in the UK. 
 
The counterpart to these large distortions in the Irish and Netherlands current 
accounts has been an understatement of credit items in the UK current account. 
While the Irish and the Dutch economies are small relative to that of the UK, the 
size of the distortion to the current account surpluses in Ireland and the 
Netherlands is large enough to make a significant impact on the UK current account 
deficit. The counterpart to the overstatement of current account surpluses in 
Ireland and the Netherlands could be an overstatement of the UK current account 
deficit by up to 2 percentage points of GDP. 
 
The fact that these problems are now affecting a number of EU economies suggests 
that Eurostat needs to develop the European system of National Accounts to 
provide additional material that will properly identify developments in economic 
welfare affecting those living in individual economies. Ideally, it would be desirable 
to publish data on where GNP arises by sector. This would deal with some of the 
problems identified in this Box. 
 
Output 
As discussed above, allocating the growth in output across sectors of the 
economy is very difficult under current circumstances. This problem particularly 
affects the tradable sector of the economy – manufacturing and distribution and 
software. Agriculture saw very rapid growth in output in 2013 (Table 1). However, 
this was a recovery after a very bad year in 2012. Our forecast for that sector in 
2014 and 2015 is for a return to relatively low growth of just over 1 per cent a 
year.  
 
TABLE 1 Industry and Output
 
 
2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Value Volume Change 
 
€ bn % % % % 
Agriculture 3.8 -12.6 16.5 1.2 1.2 
Industry 39.6 -2.1 -2.3 2.0 2.5 
Distribution, Transport, Software 
and Communications 
41.0 1.0 -5.2 2.0 3.5 
Public Administration and Defence 6.5 -2.6 -2.2 -1.0 -0.5 
Other Services 65.7 2.7 2.4 3.1 4.7 
GVA at Factor Cost 157.5 -0.5 -0.4 2.6 3.8 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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While the latest indicators suggest exceptional growth in gross output in 
manufacturing this year, much of this is coming from the Pharmaceuticals sector. 
Thus, we see a much less dramatic growth in GVA arising in the industrial sector: 
2.0 per cent in 2014 and 2.5 per cent in 2015. 
 
The fall in output in distribution and software in 2013 appears to have been 
primarily due to changing accounting practises by some key multinationals in the 
IT sector. Once again, we anticipate some legacy effects pulling down growth in 
2014 to only 2 per cent. However, for 2015, with the effects of the “patent cliff” 
coming to an end, we are assuming that these accounting effects will have played 
out and that the output of the sector will grow by around 3.5 per cent. 
 
The fall in public administration output is a function of falling numbers arising 
from a further tough Budget for 2014, with carryover effects into 2015. The Other 
Services sector, which is large in size, is expected to show vigorous growth both 
this year and next year, making an important contribution to the growth in 
economy-wide GVA at factor cost. 
 
Box 2: Where Is the Economy At? An Application of the Nowcasting Approach 
By David Byrne and Kieran McQuinn 
 
 
Providing an accurate and timely estimate of the rate of output growth within the 
economy is an integral component of the Commentary. In seeking to estimate the 
economy’s performance at any point in time, we now complement the traditional 
forecasting model used in the Commentary with the nowcasting methodology. This 
approach, following the work of Giannone, Reichlin and Small (2005)5, enables 
forecasters to use information from a large panel of potentially relevant 
macroeconomic indicators to generate estimates of economic performance.  In 
particular, it allows forecasters to address two key issues in producing timely and 
accurate forecasts. 
 
Typically, the output variable of interest (GDP/GNP) is only released after the close 
of the reference period i.e., the first estimate of Irish quarterly GDP is released 
between 10 to 11 weeks after the end of the reference quarter. However, in the 
interim period, many monthly conjunctural indicators become available which 
provide within-quarter information that could be used to provide a more accurate 
assessment of the current state of the economy. 
                                                            
5  Giannone, D., Reichlin, L. and D. Small (2005). “Nowcasting: The real-time informational content of macroeconomic 
data”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 665-676, May. 
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A further issue confronting forecasters is that the panel of indicator variables 
potentially available is unbalanced at the end of the sample (commonly referred to 
as a “jagged” edge structure). These indicators are released in a non-synchronous 
manner and with varying publication lags. Traditional econometric models will 
generally only use balanced datasets i.e., where all series would end in the same 
period. 
 
The nowcasting approach enables empirical models to use available high frequency 
information with respect to the reference period in question and extracts the 
predictive component of output from a large number of data series. It also exploits 
the jagged edge structure to enable the most up-to-date information be used for 
the current period (the estimate for the current period is labelled the “nowcast”).  
In an international context, nowcasting techniques are increasingly being used by 
central banks and other institutions which generate macroeconomic forecasts. 
Applications of the nowcasting approach in an Irish context can be observed in 
Liebermann (2012)6 and D’Agostino, McQuinn and O’Brien (2011).7 
 
In Table B1 we summarise quarter-on-quarter growth rates in GDP for the first 
three quarters of 2014. The observation for Q1 2014 is the most recent actual 
observation for GDP released by the CSO. The entry for Q2 2014 is the backcast 
(this is when the nowcasting approach is used to generate historical estimates of 
GDP when there are still no official estimates available) and for Q3 we report the 
nowcast estimate. The latter estimate suggests that the economy at present has 
grown by 1.6 per cent between Q2 and Q3 of this year.  
 
TABLE B2.1 Irish Quarter-on-Quarter GDP Growth Rates for Q1 2014 to Q3 2014 
 
Period Nature of Estimate Estimate % 
Q1 2014 Actual 2.7 
Q2 2014 Backcast 2.1 
Q3 2014 Nowcast 1.6 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
 
  
                                                            
6 Liebermann, J. (2012). “Short-term forecasting of quarterly gross domestic product growth”, Article 01, Central Bank 
of Ireland Quarterly Bulletin January. 
7 D’Agostino, A., McQuinn, K. and O’Brien, D. (2012). “Now-casting Irish GDP”, OECD Journal: Journal of Business Cycle 
Measurement and Analysis, OECD Publishing, CIRET, Vol. 2, pp. 1-11. 
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3 
 
Exports of Goods and Services 
 
The value of goods exports has increased by 10.4 per cent in the first quarter of 
2014. This is the largest increase, quarter-on-quarter, since the issue of the 
pharmaceutical patent cliff8 arose in early 2012. Statistics from the CSO, 
comparing April 2013 with April 2014, confirmed an 18 per cent drop in the 
exports of medical and pharmaceutical products and a 9 per cent drop in the 
export of organic chemicals in value terms, both of which had become primary 
drivers in Ireland’s exports in recent years. Despite this, however, we believe the 
growth experienced in the first quarter of the year is evidence that Irish exports 
are starting to regain a steady footing following the negative impact of the 
pharma patent cliff. The figures may also suggest that goods exports are 
beginning to rely on a broader range of sectors with year-on-year growth in the 
export of Food and Live Animals and Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles up 12 
per cent and 15.4 per cent respectively. Sterling has also strengthened by 5 per 
cent against the Euro in the first six months of the year which may be a 
contributory factor for the growth of goods exports.  
 
The release of new data from the CSO confirms strong growth in the value of 
total service exports in Q1 of 2014 of just over 5 per cent when compared to Q1, 
2013. Much of this growth can be attributed to increases in Business Services 
exports although collectively quarter-on-quarter growth in many of the 
subsectors of service exports is down. 
 
The terms of trade has increased to 76.8 index points in April 2014 from 76.1 in 
March 2014. Terms of trade refer to the amount of imports a unit of exports can 
buy. If we see the price of exports rise more slowly than import prices, for 
example, then the terms of trade will deteriorate since a larger volume of exports 
are needed to pay for a given volume of imports. Over the period 2007 through 
2011 the value of GNP was negatively affected when adjusted for the terms of 
trade. This was largely due to a fall in export prices over the period, alongside 
rising import prices. Based on our expectations for both imports and exports we 
forecast that Ireland’s terms of trade will show signs of improvement in 2014 and 
2015 following several years of deterioration. 
                                                            
8  This is discussed in detail in FitzGerald, J., (2013). “The Effect on Major Accounting Aggregates of the Ending of 
Pharmaceutical Patents”, ESRI Research Note 2013/2/1, published in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn, 
Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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With the international environment expected to show continued recovery in 
2014 and with the difficulties surrounding the pharmaceutical patent cliff 
showing signs of abating, we forecast strong improvements in the volume growth 
of merchandise exports through to 2015. The recent Annual Report from 
Enterprise Ireland, reporting €17.1 billion in exports sales for 2013, which 
represents an increase of 8 per cent on 2012, provides support for the continued, 
expected strong performance in this sector.9 Indications from the first six months 
of 2014 are also very positive with job commitments by Irish exporting companies 
up more than 20 per cent on the same period last year.  
 
Recent data from the National Accounts show more moderate service sector 
growth than previously anticipated in 2013 and so forecasts provided in the Q1 
Commentary have been revised downward with service sector exports expected 
to grow by a more modest 3 per cent. However, we predict growth will continue 
to strengthen, at approximately 4 per cent, into 2015 based in part on data from 
Enterprise Ireland which documents growth in internationally traded services of 
14 per cent in 2012 and a further 5 per cent in 2013. On the basis of these 
forecasts we are projecting an increase in the volume of total exports of 3.5 per 
cent in 2014 and 4 per cent in 2015.  
 
TABLE 2 Exports of Goods and Services
 
 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Value Volume Change 
 
€ billion % % % % 
Merchandise 85.8 1.0 -4.1 4.0 4.0 
Services:  
   
 
   Tourism 3.0 -3.3 9.5 4.0 4.0 
   Other Services 87.3 7.1 3.8 3.0 4.0 
Total Services 90.3 6.7 4.0 3.0 4.0 
Exports of Goods and Services 176.7 4.7 1.1 3.5 4.0 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9  While data from Enterprise Ireland may be limited, it does provide some valuable information on the composition of 
exported goods and services and allows us to distinguish between foreign and indigenous exporters. 
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4 
 
Investment 
 
Over the past three years, the rate of investment in the domestic economy has 
been at an all time low. As a percentage of GDP, the investment rate, as can be 
seen from Figure 4, is presently just above 14 per cent. Up to 2008, the long-run 
average rate in the economy was over 26 per cent. This particularly low rate 
suggests that any new additions to the national capital stock are likely to be 
merely replacing that level of stock which is lost through natural depreciation. 
This significant decline in investment, which is observed across a number of 
European countries, may be one of the most profound long-term consequences 
of the financial crisis of 2007/08. The need to restructure balance sheets amongst 
European financial institutions has almost certainly led to restrictions in the 
quantity of finance available for investment purposes. For example, recent 
research by Gerlach, O’Connell and O’Toole (2014)10 highlights the impact of 
credit constraints on the employment and investment decisions of Irish small and 
medium sized enterprises (SME’s). 
 
FIGURE 4 Irish Investment Rate 1961-2014 (%)
 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
                                                            
10  Gerlach P., O’Connell B. and O’Toole, C. (2014). “Do credit constraints affect SME investment and employment?” The 
Economic and Social Review, forthcoming.     
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
% 
18  |  Q ua rte r ly  Econ om ic  Com me nta ry  –  S um me r 2014  
 
 
The recent National Accounts show that the volume of investment declined in 
2013 by 2.4 per cent to €26.3 billion. The data suggest a mixed performance 
across the different components of investment. Housing investment rose by 3.5 
per cent and investment in other building and construction was 30 per cent 
higher in volume terms. In contrast, investment in roads, a much smaller 
component of investment, fell by over 39 per cent to €632 million. Taking 
building and construction as a whole, investment rose by 14.1 per cent in 2013. 
 
A similarly diverse performance is evident in investment in machinery and 
equipment. Total machinery and equipment investment increased by 1.8 per 
cent. Investment in transport equipment fell by over 38 per cent. However, this 
reflects the timing of aeroplane purchases. Investment in agricultural equipment 
rose by 10 per cent and investment in other machinery and equipment was 
nearly 50 per cent higher. 
 
Based on our forecasts for economic and employment growth, we expect 
investment to increase steadily during 2014 and 2015 albeit from a very low base. 
Housing completions in 2013 amounted to 8,301 units, a decline of 2.2 per cent 
on the 2012 level of output. Data available for the first five months of the year 
indicate a pick-up in activity, with completions up by over 30 per cent. Data on 
planning permissions, registrations and commencements (Figure 5) suggest that 
the sector has stabilised. More recent data indicate that house completion levels 
should grow again this year and next. In particular, we forecast that the number 
of housing completions in 2014 and 2015 to be 10,500 and 15,000 respectively.   
 
A key factor determining the level of housing completions will be the availability 
of credit. Our forecast assumes that credit continues to be a constraint in the 
short term. The envisaged increase in supply is still somewhat below the 
structural demand for housing in the Irish market. In the special article in this 
Commentary, McQuinn notes that this amount is generally regarded to be 
between 25,000 and 30,000 units per annum.  Consequently, were the supply-
side of the housing market to return to a more long-run equilibrium position in 
the shorter term, the increase in investment would be considerably more 
significant.  
 
In the absence of a significant pick-up in housing investment, McQuinn, using a 
recently developed forecasting model of Irish house prices, suggests prices will 
grow an average of 6.5 per cent per annum in real terms over the period 2014 to 
2017. Thus, the current situation of rising house prices and rising rents is likely to 
remain a feature of the Irish housing market over the immediate future. 
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FIGURE 5 Housing Market Indicators
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office and the Department of Environment. 
 
With the momentum from strong growth in other building and construction 
investment last year expected to carry into this year, we are forecasting 
investment in other building and construction to grow strongly in both 2014 and 
2015. Part of this increase will be driven by continuing positive Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) flows, coupled with economic improvement, and the 
undertaking of previously deferred activity. If our forecasts prove to be correct, 
investment in total building and construction will reach €12.6 billion in 2014 and 
€14.5 billion in 2015. 
 
In recent years we have seen investment in machinery and equipment heavily 
influenced by the timing of aircraft purchases. While the timing of such purchases 
remains uncertain, on the basis of current published figures we estimate that 
they could add over 6 per cent to the value of investment in machinery and 
equipment in 2015. Accordingly, our forecasts for the volume of machinery and 
equipment investment are for growth of 5.7 per cent in 2014 and 6.9 per cent in 
2015.  
 
These forecasts imply growth in the overall volume of investment of 8.1 per cent 
in 2014 and 8.9 per cent in 2015. With the value of total investment forecast to 
grow by 10.9 and 11.7 per cent respectively, this implies that the investment 
deflator will average approximately 2.5 per cent each year, see Appendix Table 
A2. However, this growth must be placed in the context of the very low rate, by 
0
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historical standards, of investment in the economy. If credit becomes more 
readily available to the real economy, particularly for those in the Construction 
sector, then the growth in investment over the short term could be higher than 
we have forecast. 
 
TABLE 3 Gross Fixed Capital Formation, % Change in Volume
 
 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Value Volume Change 
 € billion % % % % 
Housing 3.0 -22.6 3.5 7.1 17.2 
Other Building 6.0 12.7 18.3 13.7 9.3 
Total Building and Construction 9.4 -1.5 14.1 11.7 11.6 
Machinery and Equipment 17.6 8.8 -11.2 5.7 6.9 
Total 26.9 5.0 -2.4 8.1 8.9 
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5 
Prices, Consumption and Incomes 
 
Prices 
In June, annual inflation in Ireland stood at 0.4 per cent as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 0.5 per cent by the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP). The CPI annual inflation rate in June is 1 per cent if 
mortgage interest repayments are excluded, reflecting the impacts of low 
interest rates and the prevalence of tracker mortgages in the Irish market11. 
Mortgage interest repayments fell by 10 per cent in the year to June, contributing 
to an inflation rate of just 0.3 per cent in the Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and 
Other Fuels division of the CPI. This serves to mask the 8.7 per cent increase in 
private rents and 2.5 per cent increase in the price of electricity, gas and other 
fuels, for instance. Similarly, the CPI services sub-index shows annual inflation of 
2.1 per cent rather than a rise of 3.3 per cent when mortgage interest 
repayments are excluded. The growth in services prices is attributed, in 
particular, to the rising cost of insurance premiums and the impact of the Local 
Property Tax. 
 
Provisional figures for June indicate that annual Euro Area inflation (HICP) was a 
stable  0.5 per cent, compared with the May figure. Services inflation of 1.3 per 
cent is the largest contributor to Euro Area inflation, with food, alcohol and 
tobacco prices falling by 0.2 per cent and stable prices for non-energy industrial 
goods. Since August 2013, falling energy prices had played a significant part in the 
low inflation in the Euro Area. However, energy prices were stable in May and 
rose by 0.1 per cent in June. Our forecasts for the CPI, HICP and Personal 
Consumption Deflator for 2014 and 2015 are included in Table 4. Inflation is to 
remain low in 2014 before rising moderately in 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11  See also Box 3 by McQuinn (this issue) for a discussion of tracker mortgages and mortgage interest payments. 
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TABLE 4  Inflation Measures
 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 
  Annual Change 
  % % % % 
CPI 1.7 0.5 0.3 1.0 
Personal Consumption Deflator 0.6 1.7 0.5 1.0 
HICP 1.9 0.5 0.4 1.2 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Consumption 
In Table 5 we forecast growth in consumption of 2 per cent in 2014 and 3 per 
cent in 2015, to €85 billion and €87.6 billion respectively. As discussed below, we 
forecast Personal Disposable Income to rise as a result of the continuing 
improvement in the labour market, supporting the growth in consumption. In 
addition, the first half of 2014 has seen growth across a number of consumption 
indicators. Retail sales, for instance, have shown strong growth thus far in 2014, 
following a relatively weak year in 2013. In volume terms, retail sales grew by 6.2 
per cent on an annual basis in May. Excluding the Motor Trades, retail sales rose 
by 3.4 per cent in May with respect to the same month in 2013. The CSO provides 
retail sales indices for 13 business sectors (NACE REV 2 classification), with 9 of 13 
showing annual volume increases in May. Motor Trades had the strongest 
growth, at 20.3 per cent, followed by Furniture and Lighting and Electrical Goods 
with 16.2 per cent and 10.5 per cent respectively. 
 
Car sales have been particularly buoyant in the first half of 2014: 62,280 new 
private vehicles were licensed in the first six months of the year, a 25.8 per cent 
increase on the first half of 2013. There was a 44 per cent increase in the 
registration of new goods vehicles. As noted in the previous Commentary, while 
2013 was weak in terms of sales of new vehicles, there was strong growth in both 
second-hand (imported) private vehicles and goods vehicles. Growth in second-
hand vehicle registrations has continued in 2014 despite the increase in sales of 
new vehicles; second-hand registrations were 21 per cent higher than in 2013 in 
the year to June. 
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FIGURE 6  Consumer Sentiment
 
 
Sources:  ESRI/KBC Ireland. 
 
The KBC Ireland/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index increased to 81.1 in June, from 
79.4 in May. The 3-month moving average, a representation of the trend in the 
Index, fell in both May and June following 12 months of consecutive growth. As 
shown in Figure 6, consumer sentiment is at its highest level in several years. 
Topics covered by the Consumer Sentiment Index include how consumers view 
the outlook for the economy and for unemployment, the environment for 
household purchases, how they expect their personal finances to develop over 
the coming year and how their finances compare with last year. Two sub-indices 
are produced in addition to the headline Index, one of which focuses on 
expectations for the future while the other focuses on views of current economic 
conditions. While both sub-indices have risen in tandem with the Consumer 
Sentiment Index, consumers’ views of the current state of the economy appear to 
be considerably more volatile than their expectations of an improving economy 
over the next year. 
 
The Quarterly Financial Accounts produced by the Central Bank of Ireland show 
that household debt fell by €2.4 billion to €166 billion in Q4 of 2013. This is a 
continuation of household deleveraging described in previous Commentaries. 
Household debt began to fall in the fourth quarter of 2009 and now has fallen to 
the lowest level since the fourth quarter of 2006. The household debt to Gross 
Disposable Income ratio and debt to total assets ratio provide two measures of 
the sustainability of household debt in Ireland. Debt to Gross Disposable Income 
fell by 3.5 percentage points to 191.8 per cent, driven predominantly by the fall in 
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household debt. The value of household assets increased in the fourth quarter, 
contributing to a 0.8 percentage point fall in the ratio of debt to assets to 24.4 
per cent. These measures now lie at levels equivalent to Q3 2006 and Q3 2008, 
respectively. In Table 5, we forecast the Savings Ratio to remain elevated in 2014 
and 2015, reflecting the impact of household deleveraging. 
 
The Nationwide UK (Ireland)/ESRI Savings Index surveys the savings behaviour 
and attitudes of Irish consumers. When asked their first preference for how to 
use any surplus money, the largest share of respondents (46 per cent) indicated 
they would pay-off debt, tallying with the deleveraging observed in the Quarterly 
Financial Accounts. Saving for the purpose of deleveraging may be viewed as 
distinct from the use of a regular savings account, for instance. Results from the 
Savings Index show that the proportion saving either regularly or occasionally in 
the latter form fell to 58.2 per cent in June from 59.2 per cent in May. 
 
Using micro-level, household data, McCarthy and McQuinn (2014)12 examine the 
implications of certain legacy effects of the recent financial crisis, such as 
deleveraging on the behaviour of mortgaged Irish households. In particular they 
find that the decision to deleverage amongst households has negative 
implications for consumption. They also note the role played by house prices and 
expectations of house price movements on consumption. 
  
Incomes 
The Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS) produced by the CSO 
shows that Average Weekly Earnings rose by 0.2 per cent quarter-on-quarter in 
Q1 2014 but fell 0.4 per cent on an annual basis. Year-on-year, earnings fell by 0.4 
per cent and 2.1 per cent in the previous two quarters respectively. While 
earnings rose by 0.7 per cent in the private sector in the first quarter, public 
sector weekly earnings fell by 1.8 per cent. In particular, earnings fell in six of 
seven sub-sectors of the public sector. The largest fall came in the Defence 
sector, with a 2.8 per cent drop in earnings over the year, with Health (-2.7 per 
cent) and Education (-2.6 per cent) also showing significant yearly falls in income.  
 
There was also a 0.7 per cent decrease in the number of persons employed in the 
public sector over the year to Q1 with the 4 per cent decrease in numbers in the 
Health sector representing the largest fall. There has been a 7.7 per cent (31,500) 
decrease in public sector numbers in the four years to Q1 2014. The falling 
                                                            
12  McCarthy Y. and K. McQuinn (2014). “Consumption and the Housing Market: An Irish Perspective”, ESRI Budget 
Perspectives 2015, Paper 1, June, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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numbers in the public sector may also help to explain the aforementioned falling 
Average Weekly Earnings. If those leaving employment earned above the average 
wage then this change in the composition of the public sector workforce would 
lower the average earnings in this sector. 
 
 
 
Average Weekly Earnings rose in 7 of 13 economic sectors in the year to Q1 2014. 
The Construction sector had the biggest increase, with 10.2 per cent, while the 
Professional, Scientific and Technical, Industry and Financial, Insurance and Real 
Estate sectors also had significant earnings growth. 
 
 
 
We use the ratio of forecast growth in the wage bill to growth in non-agricultural 
employment to forecast growth in Average Earnings of 1.3 per cent in each of 
2014 and 2015. It is worth noting, however, that the sectoral breakdown of 
employment growth in the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) has been 
affected by sample changes from the 2011 Census13. While the reported growth 
in total employment is unaffected, the division of employment growth between 
agricultural and non-agricultural employment likely is biased towards agriculture. 
This would lower non-agricultural employment growth, raising our Average 
Earnings forecast. QNHS results for Q1 of 2014 showed an increase in 
employment of 2.3 per cent year-on-year. While this represented a slower rate 
than in previous quarters, the labour market is expected to continue to recover 
throughout 2014. As a result, we forecast Current Transfers to fall in 2014 and 
2015, with Personal Disposable Income growing in both years (see Table 5). 
 
TABLE 5 Personal Disposable Income 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 €bn €bn €bn €bn 
Agriculture etc. 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 
Non-Agricultural Wages 69.5 71.9 74.2 77.3 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 17.8 19.1 20.3 22.1 
     
Total Income Received 90.3 94.0 97.6 102.6 
Current Transfers 23.6 23.4 22.8 22.5 
Gross Personal Income 114.0 117.4 120.4 125.1 
Direct Personal Taxes 23.1 24.2 25.9 26.9 
     
Personal Disposable Income 90.9 93.1 94.4 98.1 
Consumption 82.5 83.3 85.0 87.6 
Personal Savings 8.4 9.8 9.4 10.6 
Savings Ratio 9.3 10.5 10.0 10.8 
Average Tax Rate (%) 20.6 20.6 21.5 21.5 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts.
                                                            
13 See Conefrey T. and Linehan S., 2014. “Recent Employment Recovery”, Central Bank of Ireland Quarterly Bulletin 02, 
April. 
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6 
Public Finances 
 
Now that we are over halfway through the year, the information prepared by the 
Department of Finance in the Exchequer Returns provides a reasonable guide to 
what is likely to be the eventual outturn on the public finances for the full year. 
The end-June numbers suggested that, once again, the public finances will come 
in ahead of target for the year, with revenue from most categories of taxation 
growing ahead of the expectations when the Budget for 2014 was prepared.  
Particularly notable was the fact that, in the first six months of the year, social 
insurance contributions were up almost 9 per cent year-on-year, around 3 
percentage points more than had been expected. Because this category of 
revenue is even more closely related to employment than is income tax, it is a 
good indicator of the improving labour market situation. 
 
Once again health expenditure is likely to come in higher than planned. The lack 
of budgetary discipline in this sector has been a continuing problem, although it 
has been counter-balanced each year by tight discipline in all other main 
spending areas, including education and social welfare. Also, as in previous years, 
expenditure on debt interest is likely to be less than envisaged at Budget time. 
Since 2010 a feature of Budgets has been that debt interest forecasts have been 
rather high, leaving room for outperformance over the course of the year. 
 
Table 6 sets out our forecast for the outturn for the public finances for 2014 and 
2015.14 As we have discussed, for 2014 the outturn for tax revenue is likely to be 
substantially higher than envisaged at Budget time (by about €1 billion) and this is 
taken into account in our revised forecast. On the expenditure side we are 
assuming that any overrun on health expenditure is made up in savings on other 
aggregates. The result of these revisions, and the new CSO estimate of a higher 
level of GDP in the National Accounts, is that government borrowing for this year 
is likely to come in at 4.1 per cent of GDP, well below the Budget commitment of 
4.8 per cent of GDP. 
 
 
                                                            
14  The official 2013 figures are still not finalised. While the National Accounts for 2013 were published in early July, the 
tables covering the public finances will not be available until August. Hence, we have had to estimate the outturn 
figures for 2013 based on the latest published figures, including the Department of Finance’s Stability Programme 
Update. 
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TABLE 6  Public Finances *
 
 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 
 €bn €bn % change €bn % change 
Income      
Taxes on income incl. Social Insurance 28.5 30.4 6.8 31.7 4.1 
Taxes on expenditure 19.0 20.3 6.9 21.1 3.8 
Gross trading and investment income 3.4 3.2 -5.4 2.9 -9.5 
Other Income 3.4 3.1 -7.1 3.6 14.7 
Total receipts : Current 54.4 57.2 5.2 59.3 3.8 
Total receipts : Capital 1.5 1.7 18.1 1.7 0.0 
Total receipts - Current and Capital 55.8 58.9 5.5 61.1 3.7 
Expenditure      
Sudsidies 1.5 1.4 -9.8 1.4 0.0 
National debt interest 7.6 7.8 3.6 8.0 1.8 
Transfer payments 27.1 26.5 -2.2 26.2 -1.1 
Expenditure on Goods and Services 27.3 27.0 -1.2 26.6 -1.5 
Total expenditure - Current 63.4 62.6 -1.3 62.1 -0.9 
Total expenditure - Capital 4.7 3.7 -20.9 3.6 -1.9 
Total expenditure - Current and Capital    68.1 66.3 -2.6 65.7 -0.9 
General Govt. Balance -12.2 -7.4  -4.7  
As % of GDP -7.0 -4.1  -2.5  
 
* Our public finance numbers do not take account of the latest revisions published by the CSO. 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
As discussed in our Spring 2014 Quarterly Economic Commentary, because of the 
continuing uncertainty that surrounds any forecasts for the economy a year 
ahead, it is best to delay making a decision on how much fiscal adjustment will be 
needed in 2015 until the end of September.  At that stage it will be possible to 
have a better idea of the outturn for 2014 and, as a result, there will be a clearer 
picture as to whether the economy is following the path envisaged in our 
forecasts in this QEC.  
 
For the present, it is appropriate that the Department of Finance prepares for the 
€2 billion fiscal adjustment in 2015 envisaged in the government’s medium-term 
plan. However, if our forecasts for this year prove to be correct, such a large 
adjustment may not be necessary to get below the target deficit for 2015 of 3 per 
cent of GDP. On current trends, an adjustment of €1 billion, or maybe a bit less, 
may prove to be appropriate when the September Exchequer Returns become 
available and the Budget for 2015 is finalised. Within this framework, cuts in 
some taxes would only be possible if other taxes are raised and expenditure is 
further cut so as to achieve the necessary budgetary adjustment. It will be Budget 
2016 at the earliest before the fiscal adjustment may be complete and the 
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government may be able to bring in a neutral fiscal policy, involving no further 
overall cuts in expenditure or increases in taxes.15  
 
In preparing this Commentary, we make a stylised assumption that the 
government will implement a cut in borrowing in 2015 amounting to €1 billion; 
this is not intended to be normative. The composition of the adjustment includes 
the expected imposition of water charges for 2015, the carryover from the 
Haddington Road Agreement combined with some very limited further cuts in 
public service numbers, a small increase in excise taxes and a small cut in 
subsidies. In addition, we are assuming that the stamp duty levied on private 
sector pension funds remains at the current rate in 2015.  
 
Until Irish Water is set up as a fully capitalised self-financing entity domestic 
water charges are included under government miscellaneous revenue in the 
National Accounts. For national accounting purposes they are then netted off 
government consumption on the expenditure side of the National Accounts. In 
turn, this is reflected in a fall in the price deflator for this aggregate.16  
 
For 2015 we have assumed that the average rate of tax paid on personal income 
remains unchanged. This would involve very limited indexation of tax bands and 
allowances to take account of an expected small increase in average earnings for 
those in employment. We have made no provision for any additional tax cuts in 
this scenario. Of course, it would be possible to provide for some additional tax 
cuts if they were offset by cuts in expenditure elsewhere, while staying within the 
assumed envelope of budgetary cuts.  
 
As discussed in a separate note in this QEC, the dramatic rise in unemployment at 
the beginning of the crisis put huge additional pressure on the public finances. 
Transfer payments, which had accounted for 13 per cent of GNP in 2007, peaked 
at 20 per cent of GNP in 2011. The ring-fencing of the social welfare budget by 
successive governments meant that the increases in taxation and the cuts in 
other expenditure required to restore order to the public finances had to be even 
greater than would otherwise have been the case. However, now that 
unemployment is beginning to fall, the developments in the social welfare budget 
                                                            
15  Using the official EU methodology in their latest Stability Programme Update, the Department of Finance have 
estimated that approximately a further €2 billion adjustment would be needed to reduce the structural deficit in 
2016. However, as discussed in Bergin, A. and J. FitzGerald “The Structural Balance for Ireland” in the Spring 2014 
Commentary, this methodology provides a very unsatisfactory measure of the structural balance for Ireland. Using an 
alternative more appropriate methodology, the article suggests that no further fiscal adjustment might be needed in 
2016 to eliminate the structural deficit. 
16  An increase in revenue serves to reduce the net expenditure – hence the negative effect on the price deflator. 
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are beginning to have the opposite effect on the public finances, helping to speed 
the necessary reduction in borrowing: as the numbers unemployed are expected 
to continue falling in 2015, this will result in significant savings on transfer 
payments. However, our Demographic Model suggests that over the rest of the 
decade there will be an increase of around 20,000 a year in the population aged 
65. Consequently, in 2015 the increase in the number of pensioners will 
substantially offset the savings from lower unemployment. This is taken into 
account in our estimate of transfer payments for 2015. 
 
On the basis of these assumptions we estimate that government borrowing in 
2015 will come in at 2.5 per cent of GDP, safely below the 3 per cent level to 
which the government is committed. Because of the importance of maintaining 
credibility, it is appropriate for fiscal policy to aim to come in below this target for 
2015, so as to leave a reasonable margin in case the outturn for the economy 
proves less buoyant than expected. 
 
On the basis of these forecasts the debt to GDP ratio, which is forecast to be 
around 116 per cent at the end of 2014, could fall to under 110 per cent of GDP 
at the end of 2015. When account is taken of cash balances, the net debt to GDP 
ratio could fall to 102 per cent of GDP by the end of 2014 and to just under 100 
per cent by end-2015.17 In addition, the contingent liabilities of the state are 
likely to fall as a result of the successful sale of assets by National Asset 
Management Agency (NAMA). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
17  Here we are only adjusting for the cash balances held by the government. No account is taken of the financial assets 
of the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF). 
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7 
Imports and the Balance of Payments 
 
Imports 
As with the data for exports, the data for imports have become increasingly 
difficult to interpret. In the case of merchandise imports, a major complicating 
factor is the import of aircraft, which are of their nature lumpy: imports of 
aircraft, which could potentially have a big impact on the overall import bill in a 
particular month or quarter, occur at irregular intervals.  
 
In the case of services imports, the interpretation of trends in the published data 
is also difficult as a number of key categories of imports are inputs into the 
domestic production process of multi-national enterprises. This can result in large 
irregular movement in the series. For example, as discussed in a note in the 
Autumn 2013 QEC, the effects of changes in patent status can, potentially have a 
big impact on services imports. Services imports include payments for royalties, 
patents and a range of other service inputs into the domestic production process. 
In addition, there has been a change in the handling of many services items in the 
latest balance of payments statement. 
 
For 2013, the latest National Accounts data included a major revision to the 
fourth quarter figures for imports for 2013. Whereas the figures published in 
March 2014 suggested a big increase in the volume of imports in the fourth 
quarter of last year, this increase has now been reallocated back over earlier 
quarters of the year. Some of this reallocation related to an under-recording of 
refuelling in earlier quarters. The figures for 2013 were also affected by lower 
imports of aircraft. 
 
For 2014 the trend to date suggests a moderate increase in imports. A significant 
factor in the growth in imports this year is an increase in imports of motor 
vehicles reflecting the major pick-up in car sales. Ryanair has announced that it 
will be importing 180 new Boeing 737s between September 2014 and the end of 
2018. In a full year this may add between €1 billion and €1.5 billion to the import 
bill. We have taken this into account in our forecast of a 3 per cent volume 
increase in imports in 2014 and a slightly higher increase of 3.3 per cent in 2015 
(see Box 1). 
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TABLE 7 Imports of Goods and Services
 
 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Value Volume Change 
 € bn % % % % 
Merchandise 54.6 7.0 3.7 4.0 4.0 
Services  
   
 
    Tourism 4.6 -7.1 -0.9 1.1 1.1 
    Other Services 82.5 2.2 1.0 2.5 3.0 
Total Services 92.5 6.8 -1.2 2.4 2.9 
Imports of Goods and Services 147.1 6.9 0.6 3.0 3.3 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Balance of Payments 
 
In the latest CSO figures for the current account of the balance of payments there 
has been a substantial reduction in the absolute magnitude of the surplus for 
2013. This revision also results in an increase in the deficit for 2012 and earlier 
years. However, it does not change the picture of a continuing improvement in 
the current account, reflecting a growing contribution to growth in the economy 
from foreign demand for Irish goods and services. In 2013 there was a surplus of 
5.1 per cent of GNP, up more than 3 percentage points of GNP since 2012. We 
are forecasting a further increase in the surplus, expressed as a percentage of 
GNP, to 5.9 per cent in 2014 and 6.9 per cent in 2015. 
 
As discussed in Box 1, the improvement in the current account surplus in 2013 of 
over 3 percentage points of GNP in 2013 was likely to have been real – payments 
to redomiciled plcs did not change much compared to 2012. This reflects a major 
boost to the economy from external demand, a boost that is difficult to pick up 
from the distorted data on exports.  
 
Much of the action giving rise to the growth in the surplus arose from the fall in 
net factor income paid abroad. However, because much of that reduction was 
related to the decline in revenue from exports of pharmaceutical companies, 
whose drugs fell out of patent, it was not, of itself, the reason for the 
improvement in the surplus. (The fall in factor payments abroad was fully offset 
by the fall in the value exports of pharmaceuticals.) Instead, it was the strong 
export performance of other sectors of the economy that gave rise to the 
improving surplus.  
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FIGURE 6 Current Account of the Balance of Payments, Adjusting for Redomiciled PLCs
 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
For 2014 and 2015 we envisage a limited further improvement in the current 
account surplus to 5.9 per cent of GNP in 2014 and 6.8 per cent of GNP in 2015. 
When account is taken of the redomiciled PLCs, as shown in Figure 6, the current 
account surplus expressed as a percentage of GNP was 0.2 in 2013 and it is 
forecast to rise to 1.7 in 2014 and 3.6 in 2015. The fact that the surplus is forecast 
to continue rising in 2014 and 2015, in spite of some growth in domestic demand, 
indicates that external demand is expected to continue to play a significant role in 
driving growth in the economy. 
 
Such a growth in the current account surplus as we are forecasting for 2014 and 
2015 is not an equilibrium outcome for the economy. It reflects the massive 
continuing deleveraging by the Irish private sector. At some stage households and 
companies will go back to investing and consuming at a level commensurate with 
their income. Such a change in pattern of behaviour would result in a step up in 
the growth rate. Provided the current account remained in surplus such an 
increase in domestic demand would be fully sustainable.  This possible outcome 
was considered as part of the Recovery scenario in the Medium-Term Review, 
published in July 2013. 
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8 
The Labour Market 
 
In considering trends in the Irish labour market, it is informative to place the 
current unemployment rate in a historical context. Figure 7 plots the Irish 
unemployment rate from 1960 to the present. The rapid increase in 
unemployment from 2007 onwards is comparable to the permanently high rates 
experienced through the 1980s and into the early 1990s. However, 
notwithstanding these instances of labour market distress, a simple average of 
the data taken over this period would suggest that the long-run unemployment 
rate is around 8 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 7 Irish Unemployment Rate 1960-2014 (%)
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
 
Although the pace of improvement has moderated somewhat, the Irish labour 
market continues to experience positive developments into 2014. The seasonally 
adjusted unemployment rate is down to 12 per cent as of quarter 1, 2014; this is 
the eighth quarter in succession, since Q1 2012, where the level of 
unemployment has declined on an annual basis. Additionally, the total number of 
persons in the labour force in Q1 2014 is up by 8,800 (0.4 per cent) compared to 
the previous year.  
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On a seasonally adjusted basis employment increased by 1,700, up 0.1 per cent 
over Q1 2014, while the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate fell by 4,500 
quarter-on-quarter from 12.2 to 12 per cent. Long-term unemployment is also 
down and now stands at 7.3 per cent compared to 8.4 per cent in the same 
period of 2013. This cohort accounted for 63.5 per cent of total unemployment in 
the first quarter of 2012 and has fallen to 60.5 per cent in the most recent period.  
 
While this may appear encouraging, data released by the CSO on the Live 
Register18 indicates that continuous registration of one year or more is increasing 
steadily year-on-year to June 2014. This is consistent with Kelly and McGuinness’ 
special article in the Winter 2013 Commentary in which they note a substantial 
increase in unemployment duration of four years or more, from 14.8 per cent in 
Q2 2011 to 34.1 per cent in Q2 2013. This is contrasted with reductions in 
unemployment levels for each of the 12-17 month, 18-23 month and 24-47 
month brackets.   
 
The unemployment rate in Ireland is showing signs of steadily moving towards 
European averages. The unadjusted unemployment rate among the EU-28 
countries in the fourth quarter of 2013 was 10.6 per cent, with a comparable rate 
in Ireland of 11.8 per cent. Both Greece and Spain continue to display the highest 
rates of unemployment at 27.6 and 26 per cent respectively. Amongst the lowest 
rates recorded is Germany at 5 per cent, as depicted in Figure 8. 
 
FIGURE 8 Unemployment Rate in Euro Area 2008-2014 (%) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
                                                            
18  The Live Register is not designed to measure unemployment as it includes part-time workers and seasonal and casual 
workers entitled to Jobseeker’s Benefit or Jobseeker’s Allowance but it does shed some light on the composition of 
those not in full-time employment. 
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As outlined in the Investment section of this Commentary, the forecast in housing 
completions anticipated in 2014 and 2015 is 10,500 and 15,000 units respectively. 
However, as noted in the special article by McQuinn, the structural demand for 
housing in the Irish market is generally estimated to be between 25,000 and 
30,000 units per annum. Were this number of units to be actually built, the 
reduction in unemployment would be much more significant, particularly  given 
the fact that the majority of those on the Live Register in June 2014 fell within the 
Craft and Related and Plant and Machinery Operatives catagories at 79,737 (20 
per cent of total) and 64,650 (16.2 per cent) respectively. While Figure 9 shows 
that these numbers have decreased over the past 3 years, we may see a 
substantional reduction in the coming years resulting from a renewed investment 
in construction. 
 
FIGURE 9 Live Register: Last Held Occupation 2011-2014 (%) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Table 8 outlines the labour market forecasts for the remainder of 2014 and 2015. 
We believe that  both the labour force and the participation rate will continue to 
rise into 2015. The unemployment rate will continue to decrease this year, and 
we forcast a rate of 9.8 per cent for next year. Employment in the Services sector 
is expected to increase in line with increasing economic growth in Ireland’s main 
trading partners and we continue to anticipate increases in employment in 
Construction with recently renewed activity in this sector. The expected decrease 
in net migration between 2014 and 2015 is mainly due to the forecast growth in 
employment rates. 
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TABLE 8 Employment, Unemployment and Net Migration
 
 Annual Averages, 000s 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Agriculture 86 107 113 113 
Industry 336 343 352 371 
of which: Construction 102 102 108 119 
Services 1,421 1,431 1,455 1,489 
     
Total at work 1,838 1,811 1,921 1,973 
Employment Growth Rate, % -0.6 2.4 2.1 2.7 
     
Unemployed 316 282 249 215 
Labour Force 2,154 2,163 2,169 2,188 
Unemployment Rate, % 14.7 13.1 11.5 9.8 
Participation Rate, % 59.9 60.2 60.5 61 
     
Net Migration -34 -33 -33 -15 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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9 
Monetary and Financial Sector Developments 
 
The major short-term policy issue affecting Irish financial institutions is the 
upcoming ECB Comprehensive Assessment (CA) planned for this Autumn. Five 
major credit institutions operating in the Irish market (Allied Irish Bank, Bank of 
Ireland, Permanent TSB, Ulster Bank and Merrill Lynch), along with 128 banking 
groups across the Euro Area, will face a comprehensive appraisal of their balance 
sheets. The analysis, which includes both a point-in-time Asset Quality Review 
(AQR) and forward-looking stress test, will be instrumental in assessing the 
capability of these Irish institutions to withstand shocks to their balance sheets. 
The results of this exercise will be published in November 2014 at the same point 
that the Single Supervisory Mechanism will come into being.  
 
While the outcome of the CA is impossible to predict at this point, some 
allowance should be made for the possibility that on foot of the results, 
exchequer funding may be required for the recapitalisation of one or more of 
these institutions.  
 
Profitability 
While the income-generating ability of domestic credit institutions has been 
improving, the outlook is still very much a challenging one. Net-interest income, 
which is the main source of income for Irish institutions, increased from €2.6 to 
€3.5 billion over the course of 2013.  The main reason for this improvement was 
the decline in funding costs achieved through lower deposit pricing and the 
gradual elimination of the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee (ELG) scheme. Domestic 
institutions have also benefitted from favourable developments in market 
sentiment which have lead to a decline in new funding costs.  
 
However, the relatively low level of credit extension in the economy restricts the 
abilities of the institutions to increase net-interest income. Additionally, the 
presence of both loss making tracker mortgages, and a significant share of 
impaired loans on the balance sheets of Irish banks, impedes their ability to 
increase margins on current business. Overall post-provision losses reduced in 
2013 as impairment charges fell with the total charges dropping from €12.6 
billion in 2011 to €4.6 billion in 2013. This latter amount still approximately 
equalled the total income earned by domestic Irish banks, consequently 
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eliminating their profit levels. It is also worth pointing out that the outcome of 
the ECB’s CA may have negative implications for provisioning and consequently 
the profitability of the domestic sector.  
 
In June, as well as introducing measures to support the real economy, the ECB cut 
the main refinancing or policy rate (the rate at which it lends to financial 
institutions) to an all-time low. While this would appear to be good news for 
mortgage holders, in Box 3 we examine the breakdown in the pass-through 
relationship between the policy rate and certain mortgage rates in the Irish 
market due to ongoing profitability difficulties in the financial sector. 
 
Credit Risk and Extension  
New lending in the economy remains particularly low. The value of gross 
outstanding loans declined by 5.8 per cent in the twelve months to the end of 
2014 Q1 and was down by 26 per cent on the 2010 level. In the special article to 
this Commentary, McQuinn comments on the continued decline in both the stock 
and transactions of credit in the residential mortgage market. In addition, 
Gerlach, O’Connell and O’Toole (2014), using new micro-level data, estimate a 
negative relationship between credit constraints in the Irish economy and 
employment and investment decisions of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The outstanding balance of lending to SMEs continues to fall steadily since 2011. 
Gross new lending to non-financial, non-property SMEs, which is the “...amount 
of new credit facilities drawn-down during the quarter by SME counterparties” 
remains around €600 million by the end of 2013/start of 2014. 
 
At €55.4 billion, the value of impaired loans on the balance sheets of Irish credit 
institutions was down slightly in 2014 Q1, compared with the same period in 
2013. At 27 per cent of the total value of outstanding loans, this is still particularly 
high when compared with other European institutions where the average is 
approximately 6 per cent. While the number of mortgage accounts for principal 
dwelling houses (PDH) in arrears fell for the third consecutive quarter in 2014 Q1, 
there are still a total of 132,217 loans in some form of mortgage distress. This 
represents 17.3 per cent of the total stock of mortgages in the Irish market. The 
decline in the overall number of mortgage accounts in arrears masks the ongoing 
increase in very long-term arrears (i.e., those over 720 days), as shown in Figure 
10. Loan-level data collected by the Central Bank of Ireland reveals that the rate 
of loan default in the SME market is presently 26 per cent when measured by the 
number of loans and 41 per cent when weighted by the loan balance. The default 
rate is highest for SMEs in the Construction, Hotels and Restaurants and Personal 
sectors. 
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In a research note in this Commentary, Duffy updates earlier estimates of the 
degree of negative equity in the Irish housing market. The estimate of negative 
equity in a market, as observed in Kelly and McQuinn (2014),19 is a crucial 
component of any potential capital losses estimated for financial institutions. By 
the end of 2012, Duffy estimates that over 314,000 loans in the Irish mortgage 
market were in negative equity, however, the increase in house prices 
experienced since then results in the numbers in negative equity falling by 45,000 
in 2013 to 268,000 loans. This decline reduces the potential loss given default on 
any impaired mortgages, thereby reducing future potential capital losses. 
Consequently, the ongoing increase in house prices does have positive 
implications for the balance sheets of Irish credit institutions. 
 
While Box 3, in this section, examines mortgage interest rates, in Figure 11, the 
interest rates charged on different loan sizes to non-financial corporates in the 
domestic market are plotted. As can be seen from the Figure, the sizeable spread 
charged on loans below and in excess of €1 million, which emerged in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, persists into 2014. This suggests that firms in 
receipt of smaller loans continue to experience relatively tighter credit conditions 
than those receiving larger loans. 
 
Funding 
The overall funding position of Irish institutions has improved somewhat through 
2014. The ELG scheme was phased out through 2013, resulting in a decline in the 
proportion of total liabilities which was covered by the government guarantee 
from 30 per cent in 2011 to just under 8 per cent by the end of 2013. Central 
Bank borrowings by domestic institutions have continued to fall while the two 
largest domestic institutions, AIB and Bank of Ireland, have recently been able to 
issue new debt. This included senior unsecured debt, while yields on existing 
bonds declined further. Notwithstanding these developments, the overall funding 
position of Irish institutions is still quite precarious. The maturity profile of bank 
debt is relatively short with a sizeable amount of debt funding due to be re-issued 
in 2015 Q1. This ensures that Irish institutions would be particularly sensitive to 
any changes in international market sentiment and higher market-based funding 
costs, which might ensue. 
 
                                                            
19  Kelly R. and K. McQuinn (2014). “On the hook for impaired bank lending. Do sovereign-bank inter-linkages affect the 
net cost of a fiscal stimulus”, International Journal of Central Banking, Autumn, forthcoming. 
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FIGURE 10 Number (000s) of Mortgage Accounts in Arrears: 2012:3-2014:1
 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
 
FIGURE 11 Retail Interest Rates on Loans Less Than and Greater Than €1million Charged to Non 
 Financial Corporates: 2007:1-2014:1
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
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Box 3: The Relationship between ECB Policy Rates and Standard Variable 
Mortgage Rates in the Irish Market 
 
By Kieran McQuinn 
 
 
The announcement by the European Central Bank (ECB) that it was cutting its main 
refinancing rate to a historic low of 0.15 per cent in June of 2014  was good news 
for certain Irish mortgage holders. In particular those households on “tracker” 
mortgages faced an automatic reduction in their repayment rate of 0.10 per cent. 
This is because tracker mortgages are contractually linked to movements in the 
refinancing rate. However, for other mortgage holders, such as those on variable 
rate mortgages, the consequence of the change is less clear. In this box we update 
earlier analysis in Goggin, Holton, Kelly, Lydon and McQuinn (2012)20 which, using 
individual bank-level data, examined the impact of the financial crisis on the pricing 
of interest rates in the Irish mortgage market.  
 
Goggin et al. (2012), showed that the relationship between the refinancing or policy 
rate and the standard mortgage variable rate, which had been quite strong up to 
2008, broke down afterwards. One of the main reasons for this breakdown 
appeared to be costs relating to increased credit risk; banks with higher arrears 
rates tended to exhibit higher variable mortgage rates in the period post-2008. 
Additionally, some lenders appeared to charge higher variable rates to compensate 
for the losses they were making on their tracker loans. As the marginal cost of funds 
confronting Irish credit institutions rose sharply after 2008, tracker loans became 
increasingly difficult to fund, given the narrow margin which existed over the ECB 
policy rate. Therefore, profitability concerns for Irish financial institutions resulted 
in an increasingly higher spread between the ECB policy rate and the standard 
variable rate charged to Irish households. 
 
To update this analysis, we re-estimate equation (1) in Goggin et al. (2012) which 
regresses the standard variable rate on the ECB policy rate. This regression is done 
on a recursive basis, thereby allowing the coefficient on the policy rate variable to 
change through time. As both variables are in log form, the coefficient may be 
interpreted as the elasticity of the variable rate to changes in the refinancing/policy 
rate. 
 
Figure 12 plots the elasticity over the period 2006 to 2014. There is a clear change 
in the magnitude of the relationship around 2008/2009. However, the relationship 
                                                            
20  Goggin J., Holton, S., Kelly J., Lydon R. and K. McQuinn (2012). “The financial crisis and the pricing of interest rates in 
the Irish mortgage market: 2003-2011”, Central Bank of Ireland Research Technical Paper 1/RT/12. 
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continues to decline even after the end of the period in the previous analysis 
(2011). Thus, the spread between the policy rate and the standard mortgage 
variable rate appears to be widening from 2012 through 2014. The more the policy 
rate declines, the results of the earlier analysis would suggest, the more the spread 
between it and the variable rate will, ironically, increase as domestic credit 
institutions struggle to fund the tracker component of their mortgage book. This 
situation is compounded by the decline in competition in the Irish banking sector 
over the past seven years. 
 
 
FIGURE 12 Recursive Estimates of the Elasticity of Variable Rates to the ECB Policy Rate: 2006 – 
 2014
 
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
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10 
General Assessment of the Irish Economy 
 
The Irish economy continues to improve through 2014, with further signs of 
recovery evident in a number of key indicators. Certain consumption items have 
recently registered strong increases in demand, with the results of market 
sentiment surveys also suggesting growing levels of confidence returning to the 
economy. Housing demand continues to increase, albeit in a regionally disparate 
manner, with price increases in the Dublin area experiencing particularly strong 
growth. Additionally, the better than expected recent budgetary returns suggest 
a continuance of ongoing increases in activity and employment levels that began 
in late 2012.  
 
However, recent micro-level research highlights a number of challenging issues, 
which may impede a fuller and more consolidated recovery in the economy. In 
particular, legacy effects from the financial crisis have potential implications for 
recovery in key macroeconomic aggregates. McCarthy and McQuinn (2014), for 
example, note the negative relationship between debt reduction practices 
amongst mortgaged Irish households and their consumption levels. Given the 
high levels of household indebtedness evident in the Irish economy, this suggests 
future increases in consumption levels may not be as large as the overall rate of 
economic growth would suggest. 
 
Gerlach, O'Connell and O'Toole (2014) note that credit constraints in the Irish 
economy appear to have negative implications for investment and employment 
decisions of small and medium-sized enterprises. More generally, investment in 
the Irish economy is a key concern; the investment rate (i.e., the ratio of 
investment to GDP) is down to just over 14 per cent – a fifty year low. Such a low 
rate indicates that, at present, new additions to the national capital stock are 
merely compensating for losses due to the natural rate of depreciation. This 
observation, along with the present high rate of unemployment and the low level 
of credit being extended by the financial sector, implies that the Irish economy is 
still somewhat below its potential level. 
 
Continuing difficulties in the Irish banking sector impact the real economy in a 
number of ways. For example, in the Monetary and Financial section of the 
Commentary we discuss the manner in which the pass through of ECB policy rates 
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to the Irish mortgage market is somewhat complicated due to ongoing 
profitability pressures in the domestic financial sector. 
 
An additional point of concern for Ireland is the anaemic growth prospects of the 
Euro Area - a key trading partner. Concerns about European growth are also 
compounded by the on-going prospects for disinflation in the Euro Area; both 
inflation and real GDP are forecast to grow by just over 1 per cent for each of the 
next two years. While the official announcement by the ECB in June of additional 
measures aimed at stimulating economic activity is welcome, achieving greater 
rates of European output growth (say of approximately 2 per cent) requires a 
more dramatic policy intervention by European authorities. 21  
 
Notwithstanding the significance of such challenges, the continued emergence of 
strong, domestic-based signs of recovery result in our central forecast of 3.4 and 
3.8 per cent growth in GNP for 2014 and 2015 respectively. At present, GNP 
remains our principal point of reference based on the difficulties associated with 
GDP discussed in this and in the Spring Commentary.  
 
In the period immediately preceding the financial sector collapse of 2007/08, the 
performance of the Irish economy was synonymous with that of the residential 
and commercial property sectors. This overemphasis on property related activity 
almost inevitably gave way to a subsequent period of suppressed demand and 
underinvestment in that sector. Recently there have been strong signals that the 
property market is emerging from this slump with housing demand, in particular, 
showing clear signs of increase. 
 
Given the nascent stage of this recovery, the present Commentary devotes a 
significant degree of attention to the domestic housing market. In the special 
article by McQuinn, an assessment is conducted on the current level of house 
prices vis-à-vis the level suggested by economic fundamentals, commonly 
referred to as the “fundamental price”. The difference between the actual price 
and the fundamental price is frequently used to assess whether the housing 
market is in equilibrium or not. Overall, the analysis suggests that Irish house 
prices, as at the end of 2013, are still somewhat undervalued (by between 12 to 
27 per cent depending on the model used) in the market. Due to the substantial 
nature of the housing boom experienced between 1995 and 2007, and the 
significant credit-fuelled bubble which emerged as a result, Irish house prices fell 
by over 50 per cent between 2007 and 2013 and, consequently, appear to have 
                                                            
21  For example in the “recovery and delayed adjustment scenario” outlined in the MTR (2013), the European-15 
economy is assumed to grow by an average of 1.7 per cent per annum over the period 2015-2017. 
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“overcorrected”. This result is not uncommon amongst other countries, which 
experienced similar-style credit bubbles. Therefore, at present, it would appear 
there is no bubble in the Irish housing market. Using a recently developed 
forecasting model of the Irish housing market, McQuinn envisages that house 
prices will increase on average between 2014 and 2017 by almost 7.5 per cent 
per annum in nominal terms. However, it is worth noting that this increase would 
still leave Irish house prices in 2017 at 29 per cent below the peak levels in 2007. 
 
This forecast level of house prices assumes that the future level of housing supply 
is in accordance both with the current rate of supply and that level forecast in the 
Investment chapter of the Commentary.  
 
There are a number of salient points with economy-wide implications to emerge 
from the housing market analysis. Along with the significant overcorrection which 
took place in the Irish market, another reason for the recent increase in prices 
would appear to be shortage of housing supply, especially in the greater Dublin 
area. Activity levels in the housing market have witnessed a substantial decline in 
the post-2007 era. Between 2005 and 2007, over 84,000 housing units were built 
on average per annum in the Irish economy, whereas between 2011 and 2013, 
the equivalent figure was just over 9,000 units. While the former level was clearly 
unsustainable, this dramatic fall in housing investment is indicative of the general 
decline in investment across the economy observed earlier and underscores the 
degree to which the housing market along with the general economy is operating 
below capacity. For example, an increase in housing construction to meet the 
long-run structural demand within the economy, which is typically estimated to 
be between 25 to 30 thousand units on an annual basis (see Duffy, Byrne and 
Fitzgerald (2014) for example), would clearly yield sizeable employment returns 
and ancillary benefits within the economy.  
 
A further issue explored in McQuinn is the role played by developments in the 
Irish credit market. Often, bubbles in house prices are due to the presence of an 
oversupply of mortgage credit. However, in analysing the detailed statistics on 
mortgage credit, it would appear that not only is the total stock of mortgage 
credit continuing to decline, but the level of actual transactions, which is the 
difference in outstanding amounts adjusted for certain reclassifications, is also in 
decline. Thus, any existing growth in the Irish housing market would appear to 
constitute a form of “credit-less recovery”. Where increased levels of credit are 
particularly needed in the residential sector is meeting the supply-side 
requirements of the market. The present difficulty of property developers in 
accessing finance is increasingly cited as a cause of the slow housing supply 
response. Clearly confidence needs to be restored between those seeking to 
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meet the growing housing demand in the economy and those supplying credit in 
the financial sector. Apart from residential mortgage lending, it is worth noting 
that the outstanding balance of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) continues to fall steadily since 2011. 
 
Trends in house price movements are of particular importance from a financial 
stability perspective. In Autumn of this year, the ECB will be conducting a 
comprehensive stress-test of credit institutions across the Euro Area. The state of 
the mortgage book of domestic institutions and, in particular, the degree of 
negative equity in evidence will be central to their overall evaluation in this 
regard. Duffy,22 in a note, provides an important update of earlier estimates of 
the degree of negative equity in the Irish mortgage market. The 14 per cent fall in 
the number of mortgage loans in negative equity estimated by Duffy between 
2012 and 2013 is somewhat reassuring in terms of the associated improvement in 
the quality of domestic credit institutions’ balance sheets.  Furthermore, if the 
house price forecasts in the special article by McQuinn are actually realised, Duffy 
estimates that the degree of negative equity would fall by a further 24 per cent in 
2014. 
 
Morgenroth,23 in a note, examines the relationship between fundamental 
economic variables and housing demand at a sub-national, county level. The note 
highlights the growing regional heterogeneity of performance in the Irish housing 
market, a trend also recently observed in Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2014).24 Using 
demographic projections to generate the future number of county-level 
households, the analysis suggests an increasing divergence in forecasted regional 
house price movements. Dublin, for example, is expected to witness future 
annual price increases of 6 per cent, while other rural counties are forecast to 
experience a decline. Interestingly, the analysis suggests that house prices may 
have to experience a sustained period of growth before significant increases in 
supply of the housing stock occur. 
 
In a microeconomic assessment of household formation and tenure choice in the 
Irish housing market, the note by Byrne, Duffy and Fitzgerald summarises the 
findings of research examining the interaction with the housing market by 
younger cohorts of the Irish population over the period 2001 to 2013. Over the 
                                                            
22  Duffy D. (2014). “Updated estimates on the extent of negative equity in the Irish housing market”, ESRI Research 
note, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2014. 
23  Morgenroth, E. (2014). “Modelling the impact of fundamentals on county housing markets in Ireland”, ESRI Research 
note, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2014. 
24  Fitzpatrick, T. and McQuinn, K. (2014). “Unemployment and the crisis in the Irish housing market: A regional 
perspective”, Paper presented to the Centre for Policy Studies conference “Coping with recession – a regional 
perspective”, University College Cork, May 30. 
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last decade the Irish market has seen household formation increase to levels 
more typically seen in other countries, while homeownership rates have fallen. 
  
It would appear that the increase in household formation rates is driven by 
changing behaviour in the Irish market. The sharp decline observed in rents in the 
Irish market post-2008, allied to the significant increase in rental supply observed 
at that time, increased the ability of younger Irish people to form independent 
households. This shift in behaviour raises significant questions about the type of 
housing stock which should be supplied in the years ahead. The significant 
shortage in both the supply of rental accommodation as well as that for owner-
occupying purposes has, as already noted, led to recent increases in both house 
prices and rental levels. This may lead to subsequent changes in household 
formation behaviour with a possible reversal of the changes observed over the 
past decade. 
 
Some similar results and issues emerge from the three different pieces of housing 
research. In the absence of significant increases in housing supply, prices will 
continue to increase, especially in urban areas and particularly in Dublin. The 
relatively low responsiveness of supply to house prices observed by Morgenroth 
indicates that any policies considered for the housing market should be 
prioritised on the efficiency by which they facilitate greater supply. In that regard, 
using the house price channel as a means of stimulating supply is not an optimal 
response. Finally, the significant movement in housing variables apparent in the 
Irish market over the past 10 years is demonstrated to have profound impacts on 
key household behaviours and choices. 
 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 
2012 % change in 2012 2013 % change in 2013 2014 % change in 2014 2015 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 97.1 -5.5 -4.1 91.8 4.0 4.0 95.4 4.8 4.0 100.1 
Tourism 3.0 10.4 9.5 3.3 4.5 4.0 3.5 5.0 4.0 3.7 
Other Services 87.3 4.6 3.8 91.3 4.4 3.0 95.4 5.5 4.0 100.6 
Exports Of Goods and Services 176.1 0.2 1.1 176.6 4.2 3.5 184.0 5.2 4.0 193.5 
FISM Adjustment 6.4 
  
7.5 
  
7.8   8.1 
Adjusted Exports 182.5 0.8 1.1 184.1 4.2 3.5 191.8 5.1 4.0 201.6 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 Investment 
 
 
2012 % change in 2012 2013 % change in 2013 2014 % change in 2014 2015 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 3.0 6.5 3.5 3.2 10.5 7.1 3.6 21.0 17.2 4.3 
Other Building 6.0 21.7 18.3 7.3 17.0 13.7 8.5 12.4 9.3 9.6 
Transfer Costs 0.4 38.4 36.1 0.5 15.4 12.0 0.6 15.4 12.0 0.6 
Building and Construction 9.4 17.4 14.1 11.0 15.0 11.7 12.6 15.0 11.6 14.5 
Machinery and Equipment 17.6 -11.5 -11.2 15.5 8.0 5.7 16.8 9.2 6.9 18.3 
Total Investment 26.9 -1.4 -2.4 26.5 10.9 8.1 29.4 11.7 8.9 32.9 
  
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
 
2012 % change in 2012 2013 % change in 2013 2014 % change in 2014 2015 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 3.0 0.3 0.0 3.0 2.5 0.1 3.1 2.5 0.1 3.2 
Non-Agricultural Wages 69.5 3.4 2.3 71.9 3.2 2.3 74.2 4.2 3.1 77.3 
Other Non-Agricultural 
Income 17.8 7.8 1.4 19.1 6.3 1.2 20.3 8.6 1.7 22.1 
Total Income Received 90.3 4.1 3.7 94.0 3.8 3.6 97.6 5.1 5.0 102.6 
Current Transfers 23.6 -1.2 -0.3 23.4 -2.5 -0.6 22.8 -1.2 -0.3 22.5 
Gross Personal Income 114.0 3.0 3.4 117.4 2.6 3.0 120.4 3.9 4.7 125.1 
Direct Personal Taxes 23.1 5.1 1.2 24.2 7.0 1.7 25.9 3.8 1.0 26.9 
Personal Disposable Income 90.9 2.5 2.2 93.1 1.4 1.3 94.4 3.9 3.7 98.1 
Consumption 82.5 1.1 0.9 83.3 2.0 1.7 85.0 3.0 2.6 87.6 
Personal Savings 8.4 16.4 1.4 9.8 -3.9 -0.4 9.4 11.9 1.1 10.6 
Savings Ratio 9.3 
  
10.5 
  
10.0   10.8 
Average Personal Tax Rate 20.6 
  
20.6 
  
21.5   21.5 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 Imports of Goods and Services  
 
 
2012 % change in 2012 2013 % change in 2013 2014 % change in 2014 2015 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 54.6 1.8 3.7 55.6 4.7 4.0 58.2 4.7 4.0 61.0 
Tourism 4.6 -0.1 -0.9 4.6 3.6 1.1 4.8 4.6 1.1 5.0 
Other Services 82.5 1.8 1.0 84.0 3.5 2.5 86.9 4.0 3.0 90.4 
Imports of Goods and 
Services 136.6 1.3 0.0 138.3 4.0 0.0 143.8 4.3 0.0 150.0 
FISM Adjustment 10.5 
  
9.4 
  
9.8   10.2 
Adjusted Imports 147.1 0.4 0.6 147.7 4.0 3.0 153.6 4.3 3.3 160.2 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 Balance of Payments 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 176.1 176.6 184.0 193.5 
Imports of Goods and Services 136.6 138.3 143.8 150.0 
Net Factor Payments -30.3 -26.3 -26.6 -27.9 
Net Transfers -2.4 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 
Balance on Current Account 2.7 7.6 9.1 11.2 
As a % of GNP 1.9 5.1 5.9 6.9 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 86 107 113 113 
Industry 336 343 352 371 
Of which: Construction 102 102 108 1189 
Services 1,421 1,431 1,455 1,489 
Total at Work 1,838 1,881 1,921 1,973 
Unemployed 316 282 249 215 
Labour Force 2,154 2,163 2,169 2,188 
Unemployment Rate, % 14.7 13.1 11.5 9.8 
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Bubble, Bubble Toil and Trouble?1 An 
Assessment of the Current State of the Irish 
Housing Market 
Kieran McQuinn2 
Abstract 
Following the substantial pre-2007 housing bubble experienced in the domestic 
economy, Irish house prices continued to fall for almost seven years up to the 
mid-point of 2013. Since 2013 the rate of price increases observed, particularly in 
the Dublin area, has prompted concerns of another price bubble emerging. In this 
paper, the results from an earlier analysis of Irish house prices are updated and 
supplemented with cross-country indicators of housing market conditions. The 
results suggest that Irish house prices, as of December 2013, were still somewhat 
undervalued and, in the absence of a significant housing supply response, are 
likely to continue to increase in the coming years. 
 
Introduction 
Assessing the current state of the Irish property market in terms of price 
developments has arguably never been more important. For example, Central 
Bank estimates, following on work by Duffy (2010), suggest that between 40 to 
50 per cent of the total stock of Irish mortgages was, at end-2012, in negative 
equity (McCarthy and McQuinn (2014)). Understanding future developments in 
the equity position of these households is essential in estimating the implications 
of housing developments for general economic growth. Recent research 
(McCarthy and McQuinn (2013)) demonstrates the presence of a relatively strong 
wealth effect out of housing in an Irish context. Therefore, house price 
movements have a particular relevance for Irish economic performance through 
the consumption channel.  
 
The future path of Irish house prices is also of considerable importance from a 
financial stability perspective. In late 2014 Irish financial institutions will be the 
subject of a European wide stress-test conducted jointly by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) of the European 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1
  With apologies to Mr. William Shakespeare. 
2
  Thanks to Frances Ruane, John FitzGerald, David Duffy (ESRI), Trevor Fitzpatrick (University of Southampton) and 
Diarmaid Smyth (Irish Fiscal Council) for comments on an earlier draft. Any errors are the responsibility of the author. 
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Central Bank (ECB). A key variable in the stress-test framework will be future 
house price levels. In particular, future house price levels will determine the loss 
given default confronting Irish credit institutions in the face of possible future 
mortgage defaults. 
 
The scale of the persistent increase in Irish house prices over the period 1995 to 
2007 was unparalled across western economies and unsurprisingly led to a 
disproportionate degree of economic activity concentrating in the residential and 
commercial real estate sectors. The subsequent decline in prices exposed 
significant vulnerabilities across the household and financial sectors. Indeed the 
resulting difficulties exposed in the Irish financial sector were one of the main 
reasons for the programme of support entered into by Irish authorities in 
November 2010 with the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission 
(EC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or “Troika”. The dramatic decline 
in prices post 2007, coupled with the large number3 of households which had 
taken out a mortgage during the 2005-2007 period, meant that most of the Irish 
financial institutions were exposed to substantial mortgage arrears and negative 
equity crisis. When international wholesale money markets dried up following the 
global financial crisis of 2007/08, Irish institutions were, by international 
standards, especially susceptible to funding difficulties owing to their perceived 
property-related exposures. 
 
After the significant post-2007 decline in prices, recent developments in the 
housing market have seen Irish house prices, particularly in Dublin, increase 
again. In 2013, national house prices increased annually by 6.4 per cent, with 
prices in Dublin, over the same period, increasing by 15.7 per cent. Figure 1 plots 
year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter changes in nominal house prices4 from 2002 
to the present. The graph shows when growth rates in Irish house prices became 
negative and subsequently positive again.  
 
On a quarter-on-quarter basis, it would appear Irish prices first registered a 
decline in Q4 2007 with annual rates declining first in Q1 2008. Thereafter, price 
declines were substantial with the single largest annual decline (23 per cent) 
being observed in Q3 2009. Year on year changes were not positive again until Q2 
2013, thus constituting 21 quarters of negative year-on-year growth. The total 
peak to trough fall was almost 51 per cent.5 While the pre-2007 house price 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3
  Approximately 30 per cent of the total stock of mortgages were issued during this period. 
4
  Apart from the next section, Irish house prices are the official CSO series post-2005 with prices pre-2005 backcast 
using the Department of the Environment second-hand house price series. 
5
  This is measured between 2007 quarter 3 and 2013 quarter 1. This peak to trough fall can be compared with similar 
cross-country estimates presented in Table 2 (page 7) of Kennedy and McQuinn (2011). 
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boom was significant, this consistent period of house price declines does 
constitute a substantial correction. 
 
FIGURE 1 Year-on-Year and Quarter-on-Quarter Changes in Irish House Prices (Nominal) 2002: 1 
 -2013:4
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
With house prices increasing recently, almost inevitably given previous difficulties 
experienced, some commentary has already focused on the possibility of another 
“bubble” in Irish house prices. By bubble we mean house price increases which 
are not warranted by market fundamentals and which consequently may be 
regarded as being determined by some form of irrational exuberance on the part 
of market investors.  
 
In this paper, we update previous analysis conducted by Kennedy and McQuinn 
(2012) and assess the present relationship between actual and “fundamental” 
Irish house prices as of December 2013. In analysing property markets, a 
fundamental house price is a frequently used concept and constitutes the price 
which would be suggested by fundamental economic variables in the economy 
such as interest rates, income levels, unemployment rates, demography and 
housing supply. We also avail of recent research to forecast house prices over the 
period 2014 to 2017. 
 
Our results here echo the earlier findings of Kennedy and McQuinn (2012) in that 
Irish house prices at end-December 2013 were still significantly undervalued. 
Thus, the housing market would appear to have overcorrected in the post-2007 
period. This result, as noted by Kennedy and McQuinn (2012), is not uncommon 
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across markets which experienced similar type booms and busts. Kennedy and 
McQuinn (2011) present evidence of similar type of overcorrection in the UK, 
Finnish and Swedish housing markets. Our forecast model suggests that Irish 
house prices will grow in real terms by an annual average of 6.5 per cent from 
December 2013 to 2017. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; in the next section we benchmark 
recent developments in the Irish property market against developments across 
countries. We then present the suite of models used to determine the 
“fundamental house price” with a subsequent section detailing the forecast 
model and results. A final section offers some concluding comments.  
 
A Cross-Country Perspective 
One of the few benefits of an international house price boom and bust is the 
significant increase in research and databases that have been generated for the 
housing area. One such resource is the international house price database 
maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,6 which compiles and maintains 
quarterly house price information for 22 advanced economies from 1975 
onwards. The database also contains information on household disposable 
income for the same period. 7 The disposable income series is a per capita series 
using working age population as the relevant denominator (Mack and Martínez-
García (2011) contain country by country information on the calculation of both 
the house price and income series). 
 
It is useful to benchmark the Irish property market against foreign comparators 
over the period 1995 to 2013, separating this period into the boom (1995 to 
2007) and the bust (2008 to the present) phases. Table 1 summarises the average 
growth rates over these periods and orders countries by the largest changes for 
the respective periods. 
 
What is apparent from an Irish perspective is that domestic house price 
movements were largest across all the countries in question in both the boom 
and subsequent bust period. Between 1995 and 2007 Irish price increases were 
also substantially greater than those experienced by other European and Euro 
Area countries. The sharp decline in prices post 2007 is also somewhat larger 
than other countries experiencing a fall in prices. Only Spain experienced 
comparable price movements over the period. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6
  For more information on this see http://www.dallasfed.org/institute/houseprice/ 
7
  The author acknowledges use of the dataset described in Mack and Martínez-García (2011). 
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More generally, as Kennedy and McQuinn (2012) also point out, the negative 
house price movements in both Germany and, particularly, Japan during the 
former period were atypical by international standards while the Japanese 
market continued to witness price falls after 2007. 
 
TABLE 1 Percentage Change in Nominal Cross-Country House Prices 1995-2013 
Country 1995:1-2007:1 Country 2007:2-2013:4 
Ireland 174.5 Australia 28.5 
South Africa 166.2 South Africa 26.4 
Spain 115.1 Norway 26.4 
United Kingdom 114.5 Switzerland 26.2 
Denmark 107.6 Canada 24.5 
The Netherlands 100.1 Belgium 19.0 
New Zealand 94.9 Sweden 18.2 
Norway 93.3 Luxembourg 17.4 
Finland 92.9 South Korea 14.9 
Australia 91.5 Germany 14.2 
Luxembourg 90.6 New Zealand 13.3 
Sweden 89.7 Finland 9.5 
France 89.5 United Kingdom 4.8 
Croatia 79.5 France 2.2 
Belgium 77.8 United States -13.1 
United States 72.7 Italy -14.9 
Canada 65.2 Japan -17.5 
Italy 60.8 Denmark -18.1 
South Korea 38.1 The Netherlands -19.1 
Switzerland 5.8 Croatia -31.4 
Germany -2.78 Spain -35.6 
Japan -42.5 Ireland -59.4 
 
Source:  http://www.dallasfed.org/institute/houseprice/ 
 
 
Next we generate a house price to economic fundamental ratio by combining the 
house price series with that on personal disposable income. 8 This follows earlier 
work, using the same data, by Grossman, Mack, Pavlidis, Paya, Peel and Yusupova 
(2013) and provides an indication of the trend in the relative affordability of 
house prices across countries. In Figure 2 we plot the ratio of house prices to 
disposable income (PI) over the period 1990 to 2013 for a select sub-sample of 
countries: Ireland, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), the 
Netherlands and Spain.9 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8
  Note both series are in index form with 2005 = 100, therefore, the house price to disposable income series is a ratio 
of indices. 
9
  The sub-sample was chosen on the basis that the countries concerned had price movements which appeared closest 
to that of the Irish case. 
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FIGURE 2 Ratio of House Prices to Disposable Income for a Select Sub-sample of Countries 1990:1
 -2013:4
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
Over the period all countries register significant fluctuations in the ratio denoting 
that house prices became significantly less and then more affordable through 
time. We include an average of the ratio of both indices, which is the average 
across all the countries (in Table 1) over the period in question (0.789). If we 
assume this constitutes some long-run equilibrium rate, then it is clear that all of 
the housing markets in question have experienced periods of both under and 
over valuation since 1990 with the Irish market experiencing particularly strong 
fluctuations. Up to 1995 the Irish ratio was the lowest across the countries 
included and thereafter began to rise sharply as house prices increased. By 2007 
both Spain and the UK had ratios which were broadly in line with the Irish rate; 
however, the Irish rate fell by a greater degree up to 2012 suggesting that Irish 
house prices became increasingly affordable by international standards. 
 
To compare the position at the height of the Irish property boom with 2013, 
Figure 3 plots the respective ratios across the entire sample for the periods Q4 
2006 and Q4 2013. The change in relative affordability from an Irish perspective is 
readily apparent. In 2006:4, by cross country standards, house price levels 
relative to income in Ireland were particularly high – third only to Norway and 
Denmark in the sample. However, by the end of 2013, Irish house prices had 
become more affordable than in any other country. Spain and the US also 
experienced a similar re-alignment over this time, while Japan’s ratio continued 
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its long decline. This cross-country evidence would suggest that Irish house 
prices, based on disposable income levels, were somewhat undervalued at end 
2013. 10 These results are broadly similar to those in Demographia (2014). 
 
FIGURE 3 Cross-Country Ratio of House Prices to Disposable Income for 2006:4 and 2013:4
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
In the next section we examine the relationship between Irish house prices and 
market fundamentals in a more formal manner. 
 
Estimates of Market (Dis)equilibrium 
To get a greater understanding of where Irish house prices are vis-à-vis key 
market fundamentals we now present the results of four different models of the 
fundamental house price and compare the estimates with the actual house price 
level. The models used are the same as those applied in Kennedy and McQuinn 
(2012) and are relatively standard in the house price literature. The models are a 
form of inverted demand function where house prices are specified as a function 
of key market fundamentals. The models may be summarised as follows: 
 
Model 1: The standard reduced-form approach where prices are a function of 
income levels, real interest rates, population levels and the total housing stock. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10
  Of course the price to income ratio does not capture the significant build-up in household indebtedness which is likely 
to have occurred in a number of these housing markets. 
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See McQuinn (2004) for a detailed review of the literature in terms of the 
reduced form, inverted demand approach. 
 
Model 2: A related approach specifies house prices in terms of income levels, the 
capital stock per person and the user cost of capital (see Murphy, 2005). In the 
user cost of capital variable we incorporate house price expectations through the 
expected capital appreciation term. For house price expectations we follow Kelly 
and McQuinn (2014), Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) and Duca, Muellbauer 
and Murphy (2011) in using lagged house price appreciation over the previous 
four years.  
 
Model 3: The affordability specification used in McQuinn and O'Reilly (2007) and 
(2008), which combines income levels and interest rates. This specification uses a 
mortgage annuity formula to combine interest rates and disposable income to 
calculate the average amount that households are able to borrow. By combining 
interest rates and income levels in a nonlinear manner, the model places a 
significant emphasis on interest rate changes.  
 
Model 4: A related version of the affordability model which explicitly allows for 
the role of credit (Addison-Smyth, McQuinn and O'Reilly (2009)). In particular, the 
model includes the funding gap of Irish financial institutions, that is the difference 
between their deposit based funding and their total lending.  This is in order to 
gauge the impact on house prices of the significant increase in wholesale funding 
experienced by Irish financial institutions from 2003 onwards. 
 
The models are all estimated over the period 1982 quarter 4 to 2013 quarter 4.11 
In Figure 4 we present the results of the models along with the actual house price 
over the period Q1 2000 to Q4 2013, while in Figure 5 we chart the deviation 
between the respective actual and fundamental prices. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11
  Detailed econometric results along with the RATS program used to generate the findings are available, upon request, 
from the author.  
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FIGURE 4 Actual and Fundamental Real House Prices 2000:1-2013:4 (Logs)
 
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 Percentage Difference between Actual and Fundamental Prices 2000:1-2013:4
 
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
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The results suggest that, in accordance with the earlier analysis of Kennedy and 
McQuinn (2012) and notwithstanding the price increases since then, Irish house 
prices still appeared to be undervalued at end-2013 with estimates of the 
undervaluation varying between 12 and 27 per cent. The latter result is estimated 
with Model 3 which places a significant emphasis on nominal interest rates. 
Excluding this specification suggests that the current rate of undervaluation at 
end 2013 in the market is in the range of 12 to 18 per cent. These results indicate 
that any reference to the recent increases in house prices as constituting a 
housing bubble in the Irish market is, at present, misplaced. 
 
Another indicator frequently used to assess the stability of the housing market is 
the relationship between house prices and rental levels in the economy. If rents 
are assumed to reflect the long-run equilibrium value of housing services then 
the house price to rent ratio can also be observed as an indicator of market 
equilibrium. Gallin (2004) and Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) are examples 
of studies which have examined the relationship between house prices and rents 
and use the ratio as a means of assessing developments in housing markets. In 
Figure 6 we plot this ratio for the Irish market over the period 1990 to 2013.12  
 
FIGURE 6 Irish House Price to Rent Ratio 1990-2013
 
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12
  Rental values are those reported by the Central Statistics Office (CSO).  
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The ratio clearly declined from the mid-1990s before reaching a minimum rate in 
mid-2006. Thereafter, as prices declined and rents started to increase, the ratio 
increased steadily and is presently at a rate comparable to that which prevailed in 
1998. 
 
Regional Differences in Prices 
As noted by Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2014), the Irish housing and mortgage 
market is becoming increasingly fragmented. For example, presently much 
market commentary concerning developments in the Dublin housing market cite 
the need for greater housing supply,13 whereas in many rural areas the post 2007 
phenomena of “ghost estates” is a telling reminder of the planning failures of the 
Celtic Tiger era. This regional heterogeneity is particularly reflected in price 
movements. Figure 7 charts nominal house prices for Dublin, Cork, Limerick 
Galway and Waterford for the period 2000 to the present.14 During the boom 
period there was a sizeable margin between Dublin prices and the rest of the 
country; however, prices became much more aligned during the downturn. Since 
2011 prices have began to diverge again with Dublin prices in early 2014 
experiencing a year-on-year increase of over 13 per cent set compared with a 
comparable 4 per cent for the rest of the country excluding Dublin. One possible 
reason for the growing disparity in prices is the different regional-wide rates of 
economic recovery. Morgenroth (2012) discusses the differences in labour 
market conditions on a regional basis for the Irish economy in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. Additionally, with supply constraints likely to be more binding 
for large cities such as Dublin, once prices begin to improve generally, the 
increase may be greater in areas where housing shortages are more pressing. As 
the estimates of market equilibrium presented here are for the national average, 
prices in the Dublin market are likely to be less undervalued than in the rest of 
the country.15 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13
  For example, see www.daft.ie October 1st 2013, www.examiner.ie November 28th 2013 and www.independent.ie 
January 2nd 2014. 
14
  These house prices are from the Irish Department of the Environment. 
15
 However, the fundamental price is also likely to be higher in Dublin than the rest of the country.  
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FIGURE 7 Regional Irish House Prices 2000-2013 
 
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
Credit and the Irish Housing Market 
One of the main causes of overvaluation in a housing market is the presence of 
excess mortgage credit; in instances where financial institutions are able to 
increase the level of lending in an unconstrained manner, this, in of itself, may 
lead to further house price increases. In such a case, housing inflation is no longer 
closely associated with the movements in market fundamentals. Fitzpatrick and 
McQuinn (2007) examined this issue in detail for the Irish housing market and 
they suggested the presence of a “mutually reinforcing relationship” between 
credit and house prices by 2004. Increases in the provision of mortgage credit 
were fuelling house price growth, which, in turn, was leading to greater mortgage 
lending. Therefore, in any appraisal of the stability of the housing market, it is 
essential to review mortgage lending patterns. 
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FIGURE 8 Mortgage Credit in the Irish Market 2004-2013
 
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
Inspection of Figure 8 indicates that the Irish mortgage market, if anything, would 
appear to be credit constrained at present; the stock of credit fell consistently 
between 2007 and 2011, with actual transactions16 in the market being negative 
since 2010. Furthermore, the average loan amount issued in the market is 
presently about 68 per cent of what it was at the peak of the housing boom. 
Thus, it appears Irish financial institutions are still deleveraging after the excesses 
of the pre-2007 financial boom. 
 
This gives rise to a number of observations: If house price inflation is picking up in 
a situation where credit appears to be quite constrained, what are the 
implications for the market when credit markets are functioning in a less 
constrained fashion? Housing bubbles can often emerge after a period of strong 
house price growth which are, initially, explained by movements in fundamental 
variables. Such a period of sustained, fundamental based growth can result in 
credit conditions being eventually eased and excess lending itself becoming the 
chief reason for further price increases. Indeed, it can be argued that this was the 
case with the Irish price boom over the period 1995-2007, with price increases up 
to 2003/04 determined by underlying developments in the economy and 
thereafter more a function of issues to do with financial market liberalisation. 
This underscores the need to monitor consistently and analyse the level of credit 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16
  Transactions are differences in outstanding amounts which are adjusted for reclassifications, other revaluations, 
exchange rate variations and any other changes which do not arise from transactions.  
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in the housing market and the importance of macro-prudential policy levers to 
control developments in the market when credit becomes more freely available. 
 
Future Likely Moves in Irish House Prices 
What then of the future for Irish house prices? In this section we avail of a 
recently developed forecasting model of Irish house prices presented in Kelly and 
McQuinn (2014). Note some models are more appropriate for gauging the 
present sustainability of the housing market (such as those used in the previous 
section), while some are better from a forecasting point of view. The model used 
in this section mainly relates house prices to unemployment and finds a very 
close relationship between these variables in an Irish context over the period 
1980 to 2013.  
 
While Kelly and McQuinn (2014) note that unemployment has been found to be a 
key determinant of house prices across a wide number of countries,17 the 
particular significance of unemployment in the Irish property market may be due 
to a combination of factors. Very often, where unemployment is included in 
housing studies it is used not just as a proxy for business cycle developments, but 
as an indicator of market expectations and consumer confidence (see Gerlach 
and Peng (2007) and Andrews (2010) for example) while in Muellbauer and 
Murphy (1997) and Fernandez-Corguedo and Muellbauer (2006), it is included, 
among other variables, as an indicator of the related concept of market risk.  
 
In Ireland the confidence factor is highly relevant, particularly, given the 
emergence of the “Celtic Tiger” in the mid-1990s. The persistent decline in 
unemployment throughout the mid-1990s from a stubbornly high level in the 
1980s was evidence that the pick-up in Irish economic activity earlier in the 
decade was now feeding into higher living standards for the domestic population. 
As a measure of potential credit risk, unemployment is especially relevant in the 
Irish case, where the post-2007 escalation in the rate of those out of work has 
gone hand-in-hand with the growing mortgage arrears problem. 
 
The forecast house price model is in error correction format and can be 
summarised as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17
  See Kelly and McQuinn (2014) for a literature review.  
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where p refers to real house prices, u is unemployment, y is income per capita 
and d is population.18 Forecast rates for unemployment and income are taken 
from the latest forecasts in Byrne, Duffy, Fitzgerald and Timoney (2014), while 
population forecasts are taken from Bergin et al. (2013). The growth in house 
prices based on the model for the period 2014 to 2017 is presented in Figure 9. 
The results suggests that, conditional on the expected future path of the 
exogenous variables, real Irish house prices will grow by 8 per cent in 2014, 9 per 
cent in 2015 before falling back to increases of 4.9 and 3.9 per cent in 2016 and 
2017 respectively. The increases in 2014 and 2015 reflect both the envisaged 
improvement in key macroeconomic variables and the degree to which prices are 
responding to current undervaluation. Importantly, the model does not assume 
any significant change in supply. 
 
FIGURE 9 Forecast Percentage Increase in Real Irish House Prices 2014-2017 
 
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The results presented here emphasise the long lasting implications of the house 
price bubble experienced in the Irish market up to 2007. Given the considerable 
difference which emerged between actual and fundamental prices over the 
period 2005 to 2007, it is not surprising that the market would subsequently 
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  Full regression results are available from the author upon request.  
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experience significant house price falls. However, it is worth noting that the 
economy has sustained a prolonged correction since then with prices falling 
dramatically and housing construction coming to a near complete halt over the 
period 2007 to 2012. Almost inevitably, prices have overcorrected and recent 
developments in the Irish housing market must be seen in that context. 
 
This is not to say that increasing house prices are either inevitable or desirable. 
Indeed as the economy continues to emerge from the recent recession, keeping 
key cost of living factors such as housing affordable is imperative as the economy 
seeks to maintain the competitiveness advantage that has been gained in recent 
times. One clear way in which actual and fundamental prices can be aligned 
without future price increases is through significant increases in housing supply in 
the locations where there is market demand. Recent supply levels fall well below 
the long-run structural demand within the economy which is typically estimated 
to be between 25 to 30 thousand units on an annual basis (see Duffy, Byrne and 
Fitzgerald, 2014 for example). 19 
 
It is not just increasing prices which have potentially adverse implications for 
future economic performance, the variability of prices is also an issue. 
Developments in the Irish market have resulted in a particularly acute boom bust 
cycle with prices changing to a considerable degree by international standards. 
This, of course, has implications for more general economic activity; McCarthy 
and McQuinn (2013) present microeconomic evidence of a sizeable wealth effect 
out of housing amongst mortgaged Irish households. Thus, the highly cyclical 
developments in the Irish housing market are likely to register a relatively large, 
varying impact on the broader economy if left unchecked. 
 
It would appear that policymakers are confronted with two key challenges as far 
as monitoring the housing market is concerned: 
(i) Ensuring that developments in key housing indicators are as closely 
aligned with market fundamentals as is possible and  
(ii) Smoothening the cycle in the market particularly given the close 
relationship in an Irish context between the sector and the real economy 
and financial sector.  
 
One way in which both of these can be achieved is through establishing a 
comprehensive macro-prudential policy framework which clearly sets out the 
regulatory position on the levels of credit in the residential mortgage market. In 
addressing this issue, Galati and Moessner (2012) argue both the academic 
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  Assuming that these units are the right type and in the right geographical location.  
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literature and the experience of policy practioners point towards the necessity 
for rules for accountability, transparency and efficacy of policy implementation in 
this area. To inform such a process, it is essential to continually update and 
improve the range of empirical models used to assess the market. 
 
 
References 
Addison-Smyth, D., K. McQuinn and G. O’Reilly (2009). “Modelling credit in the 
Irish mortgage market”. The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 40, No. 4,  
pp. 371-392. 
Andrews, D. (2010). “Real house prices in OECD Countries: The role of demand 
shocks and structural and policy factors”, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers, No. 831, Paris: OECD. 
Bergin, A., T. Conefrey, D. Duffy, J. FitzGerald, I. Kearney, K. Timoney and N. 
  nuderl (2013). Medium Term Review 2013-2020. Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute, Dublin.  
Byrne, D., D. Duffy, J. FitzGerald and K. Timoney (2014). Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Spring, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
Demographia (2014). The 10th annual demographia international housing 
affordability survey: 2014. Available online at: 
www.demographia.com/dhi.pdf 
Duca, J.V., J. Muellbauer and A. Murphy (2011). “House prices and credit 
constraints: Making sense of the U.S. experience”, Economic Journal, Vol. 
121, pp. 533-551. 
Duffy, D. (2010). “Negative equity in the Irish housing market,” The Economic and 
Social Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 109-132. 
Duffy D., D. Byrne and J. FitzGerald (2014). Alternative scenarios for household 
formation in Ireland, Special article, Quarterly Economic Commentary, 
Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
Fernandez-Corugedo, E. and J. Muellbauer (2006). Consumer credit conditions in 
the UK'', Bank of England working paper 314. 
Fitzpatrick, T. and K. McQuinn (2007). “House prices and mortgage credit: 
Empirical evidence for Ireland”, The Manchester School, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp.82-
103. 
Fitzpatrick, T. and K. McQuinn (2014). “Unemployment and the crisis in the Irish 
mortgage market: A regional perspective”, paper presented at the ‘Coping 
with recession: A regional perspective’ conference, University College Cork, 
May. 
Gallin, J. (2004). “The long-run relationship between house prices and rents”, 
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-50, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
Galati, G. and R. Moessner (2012). “Macroprudential policy - A literature review,” 
Journal of Economic Surveys, published online May 11. 
Gerlach, S. and W. Peng (2005). “Bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong,” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, pp. 461-481. 
72 |  Qua rt er ly  Eco nom ic  C omme nt ary  –  Sum me r 2 01 4  
 
 
Grossman, V., A. Mack, E. Martinez-Garcia, E. Pavlidis, I. Paya, D. Peel and A. 
Yusupova (2013). “Monitoring housing markets for episodes of exuberance: 
An application of the Philips et al. (2012, 2013) GSADF test on the Dallas fed 
international house price database”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Globalisation and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper No. 165. 
Himmelberg, C., C. Mayer and T. Sinai (2005). “Assessing high house prices: 
Bubbles, fundamentals and misperceptions,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 19, Winter, pp. 67-92. 
Kelly, R. and K. McQuinn (2014). “On the hook for impaired bank lending: Do 
sovereign-bank inter-linkages affect the net cost of a fiscal stimulus?” 
International Journal of Central Banking, Forthcoming September 2014. 
Kennedy, G. and K. McQuinn (2011). “Scenarios for Irish house prices”. Central 
Bank of Ireland Economic Letter, Number 2. 
Kennedy, G. and K. McQuinn (2012). “Why are Irish house prices still falling?”  
Central Bank of Ireland Economic Letter, Number 5. 
Mack A. and E. Martínez-García (2014). “A cross-country quarterly database of 
real house prices: A methodological note”. Globalisation and Monetary Policy 
Institute Working Paper no. 99 (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, December). 
McCarthy, Y. and K. McQuinn (2013). “Price expectations, distressed mortgage 
markets and the housing wealth effect”, Central Bank of Ireland Research 
Technical Paper 6/RT/13. 
McCarthy, Y. and K. McQuinn (2014). “Deleveraging in a highly indebted property 
market: Who does it and are there implications for household 
consumption?” Central Bank of Ireland Research Technical Paper 5/RT/14. 
McQuinn, K. (2004). “A model of the Irish housing sector”, Central Bank of Ireland 
Research Technical Paper 1/RT/04, 2004. 
McQuinn, K. and G. O’Reilly (2008). “A model of cross-country house prices,” 
Central Bank of Ireland Research Technical Paper 5/RT/07. 
McQuinn, K. and G. O’Reilly (2007). “Assessing the role of income and interest 
rates in determining house prices”, Economic Modelling, Vol. 25, pp. 377-
390. 
Morgenroth E. (2012). The regional dimension of the unemployment crisis, 
Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute, Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Winter. 
Muellbauer, J. and A. Murphy (1997). “Booms and busts in the UK housing 
market,” Economic Journal, Vol. 107, pp. 1701-1727. 
Murphy, A. (2005). Modelling Irish house prices: A review and some new results”, 
Nuffield College Oxford. Mimeo http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/ 
Users/MurphyA/Irish%20House%20Prices.zip 
  
Research Notes 
 
Q u a rte r ly  Econ om ic  C omm en ta ry  –  S um me r  2014 | 75  
 
*david.duffy@esri.ie 
 
ESRI Research Notes 2014/2/1 
Updated Estimates on the Extent of Negative 
Equity in the Irish Housing Market 
David Duffy* 
1. Introduction 
Negative equity occurs when the price of a property falls below the value of the 
outstanding mortgage secured on that property. Given the scale of the housing 
market downturn it is not surprising that previous research has shown the 
presence of widespread negative equity in Ireland. Duffy (2010) provided an 
estimate using aggregate data, based on data available to Autumn 2009. At that 
time house prices were down 27 per cent from their peak. However, we now 
know that the decline in house prices lasted until the latter half of 2013 and that 
house prices fell much further. The CSO Residential Property Price Index shows a 
peak to trough decline in house prices nationally of over 50 per cent, with prices 
in Dublin falling by over 57 per cent peak to trough. More recently the Index 
shows some recovery in house prices during 2013. This has, to date, been 
primarily driven by price movements in Dublin where prices in December 2013 
were over 15 per cent higher than a year previously. In contrast, house prices 
outside Dublin were moderately lower than they had been in December 2012. 
 
FIGURE 1 Residential Property Price Index 
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This note looks at the previous estimate of negative equity in light of the deeper 
decline in house prices and also assesses the impact of the increase in prices 
experienced in 2013. As well as impacting on the financial well-being of 
households affected, negative equity can also have implications for personal 
consumption (Lydon and O’Hanlon, 2012, Gerlach-Kristen, 2013, McCarthy and 
McQuinn, 2013)), savings (Disney et al., 2010), and labour market mobility 
(Ferreira et al., 2012).   
 
Section 2 sets out the main assumptions, while in Section 3 the estimates for the 
extent of negative equity are presented. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Assumptions 
In order to determine whether or not a borrower is experiencing negative equity 
we need to estimate the current value of the property and the current mortgage 
balance. Given the regional dimension to the house price increases experienced 
to date, with prices in Dublin 15.7 per cent higher annually at the end of 2013, 
while prices in the rest of the country were up by 6.4 per cent, we look at what 
has happened to the numbers in negative equity in Dublin. In addition to 
movements in price, the extent of negative equity will also be influenced by any 
reduction in the capital balance outstanding as a result of mortgage repayments.  
Our approach requires a number of assumptions: 
 
Volume of mortgages: Data on the number of mortgages drawn down each year 
are taken from Department of Environment data up to 2007, when it was 
discontinued, and from Irish Banking Federation data thereafter. Unfortunately, 
data on mortgage draw-downs are not available regionally. However, Census 
data show that Dublin accounts for approximately 30 per cent of households 
with a mortgage. We apply this to the total number of new mortgages to get an 
estimate of mortgage numbers for Dublin. 
 
House Price: Between 2000 and 2008 the price used is the price for Repeat 
buyers (movers) and First-Time Buyers (FTB) from the permanent tsb house 
price index. From 2009 price is based on the national value from the CSO 
Residential Property Price Index. Both price indices are estimated using a 
hedonic regression to take account of any changes in the mix of properties sold 
between different periods. A price for each buyer type is estimated using the 
ratio of FTB to repeat buyer price from the permanent tsb series. For Dublin, 
prices are initially taken from permanent tsb data for Dublin FTBs and Dublin 
repeat buyers for quarter 4 each year from 1996 to 2007. Thereafter, they are 
estimated as above. 
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Mortgage term: A mortgage term of 25 years is assumed for repeat buyers. 
Given the impact of the downturn the assumed mortgage term for FTBs is 
reduced from 35 years to 25 years from 2010 to take account of tighter credit 
conditions.  
 
Interest Rate: The interest rate is the representative mortgage rate for 
December each year from the CSO databank. Borrowers are assumed to 
commence paying back their mortgage immediately. The mortgage is assumed 
to be repaid in full by the end of the term. In the initial years a higher proportion 
of the repayment goes towards repaying interest rather than reducing the 
capital. 
 
Buyer type: Irish Banking Federation data are used for the share of FTBs and 
repeat buyers in mortgage draw-downs. The split between FTBS and Repeat 
buyers for the Dublin area from 2004 to 2008 is taken from Department of 
Environment data.   
 
Loan-to-Value ratio: Data on the distribution of mortgages by Loan-to-Value 
ratio (LTV) nationally and for Dublin from 2004 to 2008 are taken from 
Department of Environment data.  For more recent years, it is assumed that no 
mortgages with a 100 per cent LTV are issued. An average LTV of 75 per cent is 
assumed for repeat buyers and 85 per cent for FTBs. 
 
Arrears: It is assumed that borrowers are making full payments, that there are 
no arrears and borrowers have not released any equity from their property. 
However, previous research shows that of the mortgage properties found to be 
in negative equity, 8 per cent had also accrued more than three months worth 
of arrears on their mortgage books (Kennedy and McIndoe-Calder, 2012). 
 
3. The Extent of Negative Equity 
Based on these assumptions it is estimated that the total number of mortgage 
loans in negative equity reached a peak of over 314,000 by the end of 2012. The 
recovery in prices experienced in 2013 reduced the number in negative equity 
to 268,000 by the end of the year, a fall of approximately 45,000. Figure 2 shows 
negative equity by year. We can see that there was a substantial increase in 
numbers over the course of 2008 and over the course of 2011, reflecting in part 
steep price declines in each of those 12 month periods.  
 
The majority of those experiencing negative equity are FTBs, who account for 
approximately 57-58 per cent of those in negative equity in each year from 2010 
to 2013. This may well reflect the high initial LTVs on mortgages taken out by 
FTBs. While we do not have more recent data on the distribution, Department 
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of Environment data to 2008 show that in the years 2006-2008, between 23 and 
34 per cent of FTBs who took out a mortgage had an LTV of 100 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 2 Numbers in Negative Equity, End Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our estimates for negative equity suggest that Dublin accounted for 40 per cent 
of mortgages in negative equity at the peak of the problem, close to 125,000 
mortgages at the end of 2011. The numbers in negative equity in Dublin fell by 
over 35,000 by the end of 2013. This represents over three-quarters of the 
improvement experienced nationally and, as outlined above, is due to the 
substantially stronger increase in prices experienced in Dublin. 
 
Given that we have estimated negative equity by calculating the house price and 
the outstanding mortgage balance we can look at the depth of negative equity 
being experienced. Figure 3 shows that at the end of 2013 there were still a 
large numbers of borrowers in negative equity greater than 20 per cent of the 
house value, the majority of which were first-time buyers.  
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FIGURE 3 Depth of Negative Equity, End-2013 
 
Finally, we look at what may happen to the numbers in negative equity in 2014. 
This estimate is very dependent on what happens to house prices. We examine 
what may happen under two alternatives: 
(1) First, we assume that house prices in 2014 grow at the same rate as they did 
in 2013. We apply the annual growth rate recorded in December 2013, an 
increase of 6.4 per cent nationally and 15.7 per cent in Dublin. On this basis, 
the numbers in negative equity nationally would fall by 66,800 to just over 
200,500. In Dublin the numbers in negative equity would fall to 59,000, a 
decline of 28,200 from the end of 2013; 
(2) Second, we take the average annual growth in the Residential Property Price 
Index in the first six months to June and assume no further growth in 2014. 
Thus, house prices nationally would increase by 9 per cent and in Dublin by 
17.5 per cent. Using these growth rates, we estimate a decline in the 
numbers in negative equity nationally of 88,000 to 179,000 by the end of 
2014. The similarity between the growth in Dublin house prices in 2013 and 
the growth to date this year means that using this alternative does not alter 
our estimate of the decline in negative equity in Dublin for 2014. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The scale of the housing market downturn has meant that Ireland is 
experiencing widespread negative equity at present. The recent increases in 
house prices reduced the numbers in negative equity at the end of 2013. The 
increase in house prices has mostly been in the Dublin market, suggesting that it 
is in this location that the majority of the improvement has been experienced. 
The improvement in negative equity is important in the context of financial 
stability, (Hellebrandt, Kawar and Waldron, 2009).  The reduction in the value of 
mortgage based assets can lead to a reduction in the availability of credit to 
both households and firms as banks make provisions for an anticipated increase 
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in expected losses. The more mortgages that exit negative equity, the stronger 
the balance sheets of Irish credit institutions.  
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Household Formation and Tenure Choice1 
*David Byrne, David Duffy and John FitzGerald 
1. Introduction 
In an article in the Spring Commentary we considered the effect of prospective 
demographic changes on the need for additional dwellings over the coming 
decade (Duffy et al., 2014). A range of different scenarios were considered 
suggesting that there was a need for between 19,000 and 33,000 additional 
dwellings a year. The range of estimates depended on assumptions about 
migration and headship rates – the proportion of people of a particular age who 
are the head of an independent household.  This note presented evidence that 
headship rates in Ireland had risen over the last decade but that they are still 
lower than in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and France. However, as was 
indicated in the article, the factors driving headship rates were not well defined, 
which left uncertainty as to how they would move in the future. This note 
presents evidence from recent research which focuses on the factors driving 
household formation and tenure choice. 
 
Because of the important role that decisions on household formation play in 
determining the demand for dwellings, we have developed a model which takes 
account of many of the factors that explain individuals’ decisions to form an 
independent household.2 In this note we use this model to provide greater 
insight into the household formation process and to better understand the 
pressures that the housing market will face in the short- to medium-term.  
 
The second aspect of household behaviour we examine is the choice to buy or to 
rent a dwelling. The proportion of people renting has risen significantly over the 
last five years and it is important to understand what are the factors underlying 
this change. A separate but related model has been developed which explains 
tenure choice – whether to buy, rent or avail of social housing. We use this model 
to consider to what extent people, who have been renting in recent years, may 
now choose to buy. Such a change in preference for tenure would put additional 
 
1 This paper was prepared as part of a research programme funded jointly by the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA) and the Irish Banking Federation (IBF). 
2  Household Formation and Tenure Choice: Did the great Irish housing bust alter consumer behaviour?”, Byrne, Duffy 
and FitzGerald, ESRI Working Paper 487, 2014. 
82  |  Q ua rte r ly  Econ om ic  Com me nta ry  –  S um me r 2014  
 
 
pressure on the market for dwellings for sale and raise the requirement for future 
funding of households’ investment in housing. 
 
This research uses Quarterly National Household Survey data on individuals and 
households for the period 2001-2011. This spans the build up of the housing 
bubble to 2007 and the subsequent collapse in the housing market. Because of 
the large sample size we are able to consider the behaviour by five year cohorts – 
those aged 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39. We concentrate on these four age 
groups as they span the period when individuals normally form independent 
households, moving out from their parental homes, and it also spans the period 
when households have, in the past, tended to buy their first dwelling. 
 
In Section 2 of this note we apply the model of household formation to consider 
how changes in the cost of accommodation may affect the number of households 
and, hence, pressures on the housing market. In Section 3 we discuss the 
implications of our model of tenure choice for the number of people seeking to 
switch from renting to owning, as the cost of each form of tenure changes. 
Section 4 concludes on the implications of this research for the housing market in 
Ireland over the next few years. 
 
2. Household formation 
Historically Ireland has had a low headship rate relative to England and Northern 
Ireland. Figure 1, taken from Duffy et al. (2014) compares the headship rates in 
Ireland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales, by different age groups in 2011.  
 
FIGURE 1 Headship Rates, Ireland, Northern Ireland, England and Wales, 2011 
 
Source:   Duffy et al. (2014). 
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This shows that, across the relevant age groups, headship rates are significantly 
lower in Ireland than in the other two locations. This is despite a convergence 
since 2000; headship rates rose in Ireland while falling in England and Wales in 
the same period. Figure 1 also highlights that the 25-29 and 30-34 year age-
groups are particular focal points for household formation.   
 
The decision to form a household depends on a wide variety of factors, including 
individual traits, numerous social factors and the ability to afford the cost of 
setting up a household. Byrne et al. (2014) focus on the impact of affordability, 
notably in the context of falling rents, and on a range of individual-specific factors 
which are discussed below. Affordability is captured in two ways; the ratio of 
average rents to Personal Disposable Income3 (PDI) and the individual’s 
educational attainment. Byrne et al., find that falling rents post-housing crash in 
Ireland are significantly linked with the increase in household formation rates. In 
particular, we find that if renting were less affordable (i.e., if the ratio of rent to 
PDI were at the 2007 level rather than the 2011 one), the 2011 household 
formation rate for those aged 25-29 would have been 2.3 percentage points 
lower. In addition, the formation rate for the 30-34 year age-group would have 
been 2.1 percentage points lower. We thus find that we can attribute household 
formation by 17,000 individuals between the ages of 25 and 34 in 2011 to the fall 
in the ratio of rent to PDI. 
 
The second important factor in affordability is educational attainment. Byrne et 
al. (2014) use this as a proxy for income and ability to pay, in the absence of data 
in the Quarterly National Household Survey on individual income. Using Upper 
Secondary education (Leaving Certificate) as a reference group, we find 
significant effects of both lower and higher education. Those with lower 
education have significantly higher formation rates than the reference group, due 
to life-stage effects; their early departure from the education system allows them 
to enter the labour market earlier, to form families earlier, etc. This effect 
diminishes with age. Those with higher education also have higher formation 
rates due to their greater incomes. While they delay entry to the labour market, 
the financial return to their higher education results in a greater ability to offset 
the cost of household formation. 
 
We control for a range of other factors which are important in the household 
formation process, including gender, marital status, migration status, labour 
market status, and region. We find, for instance, that women are significantly 
more likely to form independent households than men, and migrants have higher 
formation rates than the native Irish population. The importance of the cost of 
accommodation in driving the decision to form an independent household is also 
emphasised by the fact that the model indicates higher rates of household 
formation outside Dublin. This reflects the fact that, while incomes are higher in 
Dublin, the cost of accommodation was also much higher in Dublin than in the 
 
3  Data provided by the CSO Regional Accounts. 
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rest of the country, more than offsetting the effects of higher incomes. Other 
factors including transport infrastructure and greater geographic distances are 
likely to play a role in the higher formation rates outside Dublin. 
 
Furthermore, we also use decomposition methods to ascertain whether the 
change in formation rates in Ireland can be attributed to a change in behaviour or 
a change in the distribution of attributes in the population. There has been, for 
instance, a great increase in the proportion of Irish people with Third Level 
education, and this could be associated with higher formation rates. We show 
that this played a significant role in the change in formation rates before 2006, 
but did not afterwards. This reflected the fact that a big increase in participation 
rates occurred in the 1990s to reach something of a plateau in the 2000s. 
Furthermore, behavioural change, likely in response to the cost of household 
formation, is the significant factor in the post-2006 change in formation rates. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows household formation rates for the 25-29 and 30-34 year age-
groups between 1998 and 2013. Formation rates grew particularly strongly in 
these age-groups post-crisis, despite the very large increase in unemployment 
from the onset of the crisis. The analysis shows that an important factor in the 
increase in household formation was the fact that the rent to income ratio fell 
significantly as a result of the crisis. Prior to the crisis rents had being rising 
rapidly and the cost of forming an independent household was a major incentive 
to remain at home with parents or to share accommodation with friends, rather 
than moving into independent accommodation. However, after the crisis, while 
incomes fell, the fall in rents was substantially greater. The result was that, for 
those with a job, independent living became much more affordable. This fall in 
the cost of accommodation dominated the effect of rising unemployment.  
 
 
FIGURE 2 Household Formation by Age Group, 1998-2013  
Source:  Author’s calculation based on QNHS data. 
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As the downward trend in the rent to income ratio has now been reversed, in the 
coming years this will tend to reduce the numbers setting up independent 
households encouraging them, instead, to share accommodation or to live with 
their parents for longer. This will slightly ease demand pressures in the housing 
market although the rise in rents still leaves rents approximately 15 per cent 
below their 2007 level. However, if housing supply does not respond, rents will 
continue to rise. In turn, this will serve to moderate demand by discouraging 
more and more people who are under 35 years from setting up independent 
households. 
 
3. Tenure Choice 
There has been a significant change in the tenure choice behaviour of younger 
Irish people in recent years, particularly since the housing bubble burst. Figures 3 
and 4 show the tenure choice of the 25-29 and 30-34 year age-groups 
respectively, between 2000 and 2013.  In each cohort the proportion in Local 
Authority dwellings remains fairly stable throughout. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the proportions of individuals aged 25-29 in rented and in 
owner-occupied housing were roughly equal in the early part of the 2000s. The 
share renting began to rise slowly from 2005 onwards, and then more rapidly 
after 2008. Similarly, for the cohort aged 30-34 (Figure 4), since the property 
market bubble burst there has been a big change in behaviour, with an ever 
increasing share of the cohort choosing to rent. This change in choice of tenure 
among younger cohorts in Ireland may reflect the fact that they were sufficiently 
young when the crisis hit that they had not committed to homeownership. 
Furthermore, when the housing bubble burst relative costs began to favour 
renting, incentivising younger Irish people to become renters. 
 
FIGURE 3 Tenure Choice for Those Aged 25-29 Years 
 
Source:  Byrne et al. (2014). 
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FIGURE 4 Tenure Choice for Those Aged 30-34 Years 
 
Source:  Byrne et al. (2014). 
 
FIGURE 5  The User Cost of Owning Relative to Renting 
 
Source:  Byrne et al. (2014). 
 
Figure 5 shows the costs of renting and owning: average rents and the user cost 
of housing. The user cost is a notional cost of owning a home, incorporating 
taxation, depreciation, mortgage costs and, importantly, price expectations. The 
rise in the user cost of owning after 2007 reflects a change from a period where 
homeowners were expecting to experience capital gains from ownership to one 
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where they expected to experience a substantial loss due to falling prices post-
crash. In addition, rents were also falling in the post-2008 environment, further 
encouraging households to rent.   
 
However, house prices hit a floor just over a year ago and have since begun to 
rise again. House prices are expected to rise in the next few years and households 
are probably building this into their expectations and into their assessment of 
what is the appropriate tenure choice for them in coming years. 
 
Byrne et al. (2014), model the factors underlying the choice of tenure by 
individuals. These include the relative costs of tenure, the user cost less average 
rent, and individual-level characteristics including education, marital and family 
status, labour market status, migration status and region. In addition, we control 
for household formation while estimating tenure choice, as formation was 
increasing over the period and new entrants tend to be renters. Our focus is on 
quantifying the role that movements in tenure costs played on the tenure choice 
decision. We find that these movements were important, although we note that 
a range of other factors, including uncertainty in financial, housing and labour 
markets, certainly played an important role also. 
 
Our results show that the relative cost of tenure is a significant factor in the 
choice of tenure of those aged 25-34. An increase in the user cost or a fall in 
average rents is associated with falling homeownership and increasing renting. 
The model thus shows that the fall-off in homeownership post-2008 is partly 
attributable to movements in the relative costs and partly to an increasing 
household formation rate. However, with the reversal in the trend in house 
prices, the incentive for renting relative to homeownership is weakening. Should 
house prices continue to rise, particularly due to a lack of supply of new housing, 
the user cost will fall due to increasing price expectations. This will induce a shift 
in preferences towards owning once more.  
 
If the user cost equals average rents then there is no longer an incentive in favour 
of renting. The model suggests that if the user cost falls to this level then 
approximately 2.6 per cent of current renters will wish to switch to owner-
occupied housing. These households would add to the effect of rising population 
in the relevant age cohorts, which is the primary driver of housing demand. Thus 
the overhang of potential buyers, which was low two years ago, continues to 
grow, putting upward pressure on the market for owner occupation. 
 
However, one additional area of uncertainty is whether the result of the crisis has 
been a permanent change in preferences away from home ownership to renting. 
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The crisis has illustrated the fact that homeownership carries risks, which may 
have been ignored by many households prior to the crisis. If there has been such 
a change in preferences, then the estimated overhang of additional “buyers”, 
discussed above, may be an overestimate.  
 
Our results also show that having greater means, as represented by higher 
education, has a significant effect on the tenure choice decision. Those with 
higher education are likely to be renters across all age-groups, while its impact on 
the probability of homeownership changes at around the age of 30. Before that 
age there is a significantly negative effect, possibly reflecting the fact that, 
because of the time spent gaining a Third Level education in their early twenties, 
those with higher education were not in a position to buy at the height of the 
housing boom. Furthermore, once the user cost began to fall from 2008 onwards 
it was always going to be uneconomic for them to buy. 
 
Meanwhile, in the older age-groups, having higher education is positively 
associated with homeownership, which may reflect a change in preference once 
individuals reach their thirties. Migrants also tend towards renting rather than 
owning, while households with children tend to be less likely to be renters. This 
may reflect the need for larger accommodation or the fact that households with 
children are less mobile than those without and the uncertainty of tenure 
associated with renting means that they place a higher value on homeownership. 
 
4. Conclusions 
There is significant pressure on the Irish housing market today which is reflected 
both in rising rents and in rising house prices. If households who are currently 
renting, but who would be better off buying, actually managed to buy, that could 
possibly free up a stock of dwellings to rent. Further research is required to 
establish what form of dwelling will be demanded by households in the coming 
years. 
 
The effect of the rise in rents will be to delay the formation of an independent 
household by some individuals in the coming years. This will tend to reduce 
headship rates, slightly easing pressures for additional dwellings. However, the 
growth in the size of the cohort of people aged 20-39 means that a substantial 
supply of additional dwellings will be needed over the coming decade (Duffy et 
al., 2014).  
 
The nature of the dwellings that people will seek to buy is not clear from this 
research and it merits further consideration. The research outlined in 
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Morgenroth (2014), suggests that the additional dwellings need to be located 
firstly in Dublin and its environs. 
 
To the extent that there are pressures for higher levels of homeownership as a 
result of demographic changes and changes in relative prices, this will only be 
realised if additional dwellings are built and if the financial sector can finance 
such a change. There are concerns about the willingness and ability of the 
financial system to actually fund the building sector to expand its production of 
dwellings.  
 
Until the supply of dwellings responds to the rise in prices and rents, there will 
continue to be upward pressure on prices. This rise in prices should incentivise a 
supply response. However, to minimise the price rise that will occur, it will be 
very important to deal with any regulatory or administrative obstacles, which 
may be hindering an early supply response by the building industry. 
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ESRI Research Notes 2014/2/3 
Projected Population Change and Housing 
Demand: A County Level Analysis1 
Edgar Morgenroth* 
1. Introduction 
While the recent debates on the housing market have focused particularly on 
Dublin, much of the public focus and most of the analysis of housing in Ireland2 
has been in the context of a national housing market. However, many variables, 
such as prices, new construction (completions), planning permissions, and 
vacancy rates vary considerably across the country, which implies that there is no 
homogenous national housing market but rather that there are many local 
housing markets.3 For example, house prices have been three to four times 
higher in the county with the highest price compared to the county with the 
lowest price4.  
 
Not surprisingly, there are also significant differences across counties with 
respect to underlying fundamentals that affect the housing market such as 
income, unemployment, and population growth and these determine the price 
locally and the price differences across the country. Given these differences in 
fundamentals and also their likely different future paths, one can expect the local 
housing markets to develop quite differently. Thus, while the housing market in 
some areas will recover quickly, other areas may take very long or indeed may 
not recover at all, which has important policy implications. The spatial 
heterogeneity of the housing market also implies that analysis at the national 
level is likely to be biased, as has been found by Goodman (1998). It is, therefore, 
important to understand local housing markets and consider the drivers of 
change at the local level.  
 
The lack of sub-national analysis of the housing market in Ireland is at least in 
part explained by the lack of consistent data over a sufficiently long time period, 
 
1 This paper was prepared as part of a research programme funded jointly by the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA) and the Irish Banking Federation (IBF). 
2  For example Kenny (1999), Roche (1999), Duffy (2010) Duffy and FitzGerald (2012). 
3  An exception is the paper by Lyons (2014) which considers rents and house prices as a function of property 
characteristics and location for 1,100 zones for the period 2007 to 2012 in a hedonic pricing model. He did not 
consider the effect of fundamentals which is the focus of this paper. 
4  Based on data from the ESRI/PTSB House Price index (https://www.permanenttsb.ie/about-us/house-price-
index/archive/) and asking prices published by Daft.ie (http://www.daft.ie/report/). 
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but may also be due to the relatively small size of Ireland which leads some to 
argue that analysis at the sub-national level is not important.  
 
This Note summarises some recent research into the impact of likely 
demographic trends on the housing market at county level.5 Specifically, it 
constructs a projection of the number of households in each county for 2021 and 
analyses the consequences of the projected change on the required supply of 
housing.6 The county level is chosen as data for smaller areas is not readily 
available. However, it should be noted that there are significant differences with 
respect to housing within many counties and local housing markets are also likely 
to straddle across county boundaries.  
 
2. Projecting Demographic Change at the County Level 
Demographic change impacts significantly on housing demand. An increase in the 
population resulting in an increase in households raises the demand for housing, 
other things being equal. Likewise, holding the population constant, an increase 
in household formation raises the demand for housing. Thus, understanding the 
trends in household numbers which are fundamentally driven by the population 
trends yields important insights into the likely developments of the housing 
market. With significant heterogeneity with respect to demographic change 
across the country it is useful to consider the impact of demographic change at 
the sub-national scale. Here the focus is on the county level. 
 
County level population projections are not constructed by the Central Statistics 
Office (CSO), which publishes national and regional population projections. It is, 
therefore, necessary to construct a new set of population projections. To this end 
the ESRI county population projection model (IC-POP) is utilised. 
 
This model projects the county level population for single  year of age cohorts by 
gender using the cohort component method. This method is based on the so 
called balancing equation of population where the population at a point in time is 
equal to the population at some previous point in time plus births, plus net in-
migration minus deaths over the period between the two points in time. This 
relationship can be used for forecasting proposes if the starting population is 
known (see Morgenroth, 2002, 2008). 
 
 
5  Morgenroth, E. (2014). A working paper, that apart from considering the impact of the likely county demographic 
trends, also models price changes, housing stock changes and changes in the vacancy rate across counties as a 
function of key fundamentals. 
6  Here only the demographic impact is considered, and other factors are assumed unchanged. 
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In order to operationalise this methodology it is necessary to apply assumptions 
regarding mortality rates, fertility and migration. Given that the model is a county 
level model, migration encompasses both international and internal migration. 
Here mortality rates are those used by the CSO in its population projections, 
fertility is assumed to be unchanged from its 2011 level, and international 
migration is assumed to follow that projected in the ESRI Medium-Term Review 
(FitzGerald and Kearney, 2013). The spatial patterns of international and internal 
migration are assumed to follow the traditional (pre Celtic Tiger) pattern with 
net-migration towards the large metropolitan areas and particularly Dublin. 
Household size is assumed to decline over time and to follow the trend of the 
ESRI Medium-Term Review which is applied to county level household size.7 
Taking the detailed tables from the CSO Census of Population 2011 as a starting 
point and applying the assumptions the IC-POP model generates projections of 
the population and households at county level. 
 
Figure 1 shows that the increase in the number of households is projected to be 
particularly large in Dublin, and to a lesser extent in the other large cities and the 
surrounding counties around Dublin. For Dublin the annual average increase is 
projected to be almost 8,000 households, which has significant implications for 
the required housing units, particularly if one considers that during 2013 only 
1,360 units were completed in Dublin.8 For the State as a whole on average just 
under 18,000 additional households are projected to be created each year 
between 2011 and 2021, which is smaller than the 20,000 predicted in Duffy et al. 
(2014) due to the simpler approach used in generating household numbers. Duffy 
et al. (2014) calculate the number of households on the basis of age specific 
household headship rates while the approach taken here is to apply the county 
specific household size for each county which are assumed to follow the same 
trend. Thus, the approach used here does not consider age specific factors in 
household formation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7  This implies that there is no convergence in household size across counties. The more detailed approach of Duffy et al. 
(2014, to generate household numbers by analysing headship rates was beyond the scope of this analysis. 
8  The numbers are from the Department of Environment, Community and Local Government, Housing Statistics: 
http://www.environ.ie/en/Publications/StatisticsandRegularPublications/HousingStatistics/  
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FIGURE 1 Estimated Annual Average Increase in the Number of Households 2011 to 2021 
 
 
Source:   Own Calculations. 
 
Using the projected household numbers it is possible to analyse the future 
housing requirement going forward. If all housing units were fully occupied in 
2011, then the required additional units would simply equal the number of 
additional households, i.e., 18,000 housing units would need to be added 
annually during the period 2011 and 2021.   
 
However, the Census of Population 2011 identified significant numbers of vacant 
housing units, which need to be taken into account when assessing the required 
additions to the housing stock.9 Another factor that needs to be taken into 
account is the fact there have been house completions since 2011.10 Finally, some 
properties are taken out of the stock of inhabitable properties, for example, due 
to a fire or structural defects. Here all factors are accounted for. 
 
Excluding holiday homes, some 230,000 housing units were vacant in 2011, while 
the demographic projections indicate that over the 10-year period to 2021 some 
180,000 households will need to be added. This would imply that no new 
properties would need to be built in that time period if all vacant properties were 
in locations that matched the projected population growth. Of course, this is not 
the case which is why sub-national analysis is required. While Census 2011 
showed significant levels of vacancies, it is normal to observe some level of 
vacancies, for example, because some newly completed properties are available 
 
9  Holiday homes are not considered in the calculations. 
10  In 2012 and 2013 there were 8,488 and 8,301 house completions respectively. 
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for sale. Here it is assumed that the vacancy rate that was observed in 1996 is 
what is typically observed in a normally functioning market. In total over the 
years 2011 to 2013 just over 24,000 housing units have been completed. 
FitzGerald (2005) estimated that the annual depreciation rate of housing in 
Ireland for the period 1991 to 1996 was 0.41 per cent. This figure is used in the 
calculations below.  
 
The vacant stock in 2021 is calculated by subtracting (adding) the projected 
number of additional (fewer) households, adding the properties completed 
during the period 2011 to 2013, subtracting obsolete properties and allowing for 
a ‘normal’ level of vacancies.11 The results of this calculation are shown in Figure 
2 which also shows the level of vacancies in 2011.  
 
Figure 2 shows the number of properties that would be required assuming no 
units are completed in the period after 2013. Negative numbers indicate the 
number of housing units that would need to be constructed to meet the 
projected demographic demand while a positive number indicates excess supply 
by 2021. Thus, accounting for the initial number of vacant units, depreciation and 
some level of normal rate of housing vacancy almost 60,000 housing units would 
need to be built in Dublin to meet the projected demographic demand. Other 
counties which will need to expand their housing stock include Kildare, Meath, 
Wicklow, Cork, Galway, Louth and Westmeath. However, for many counties the 
level of vacant stock and the projected demographic change is such that no 
additions to the housing stock are necessary to meet demand for the period up to 
2021.12 
 
In total for those counties, which would without additional construction 
experience a housing shortage, just under 90,000 housing (or approximately 
12,500 per year) units will need to be completed to meet demand, which is 
considerably smaller than the 180,000 implied by the increase in the number of 
households, reflecting the impact of the significant oversupply, and the fact that 
some construction has taken place. Over 60 per cent of these (90,000) are 
required in Dublin and another 26 per cent are accounted for by counties Louth, 
Meath, Kildare and Wicklow – in effect the commuter belt around Dublin. 
However, just 33 per cent of the completions during the 2011 to 2013 period 
were recorded in these counties. Thus, the analysis here shows that housing 
supply issues are almost exclusively concentrated in the Greater Dublin region.  
 
11  This approach differs to that taken in analysis for the Housing Agency, in that it takes account of the significant 
oversupply in housing in 2011 (see Housing Agency, 2014). 
12  This assumes that all the vacant stock is in places where there is demand for housing and that the vacant stock is of 
the appropriate type of housing required. In practice, this is unlikely to hold and indeed all counties have recorded 
house completions over recent years. 
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FIGURE 2 Vacant Housing Stock for 2011 and 2021 
 
 
Source:  Own Calculations. Note: Negative numbers indicate the number of housing units that would need to be constructed to meet 
the projected demographic demand while a positive number indicates excess supply. 
 
 
3. Summary and Conclusions 
Analysis of the Irish housing market at the sub-national level has been largely 
ignored in the literature. This Note has considered the implications of projected 
demographic change on housing demand at county level.  
 
The analysis of the impact of demographic change highlights the significance of 
the heterogeneity across the country. The analysis showed that while 
demographic change implies that between 2011 and 2021, 180,000 additional 
housing units would be required, the number of vacant dwellings implies that for 
many counties no additional housing units will be needed. Accounting for current 
oversupply only half of the 180,000 will be needed of which over 60 per cent of 
these are required in Dublin and another 26 per cent are accounted for by 
counties Louth, Meath, Kildare and Wicklow. Thus, the additional demand is 
highly concentrated in the Greater Dublin area. Given that 33 per cent of the 
completions during the 2011 to 2013 period were recorded in the Greater Dublin 
Area and given that the total number of completions is below what is needed to 
meet demand, this will result in significant housing shortages if the rate of 
housing completions is not increased rapidly.  
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ESRI Research Notes 2014/2/4 
The Distribution of Income and the Public 
Finances 
John FitzGerald* 
The economic crisis, which began in 2008, has seen a dramatic change in 
circumstances for most of the population in Ireland. It is estimated that average 
personal disposable income per head has fallen from a peak of around €22,800 in 
2008 to around €20,900 in 2014, a decline of 8 per cent1. The rate of 
unemployment, which averaged 4.7 per cent of the labour force in 2007, peaked 
at 14.7 per cent of the labour force in 2012 and it is forecast to average 11.5 per 
cent in 2014. Thus most of the population have suffered a serious decline in living 
standard but the decline has been most acute for those who lost their jobs.  
 
Nolan, et al., 2014, and Callan et al., 2013b, document developments in the 
distribution of income in Ireland in the period to 2011. They show how the Gini 
coefficient, the most commonly used summary measure of income inequality2, 
has fallen during the crisis and remains below the levels of the peak of the boom, 
indicating a reduction in income inequality. In this case the measure is calculated 
using data for equivalised disposable income per person, including the effects of 
taxation and social welfare payments. The latest data for 2012 from the CSO EU 
SILC are consistent with this picture.  
 
This reduction in income inequality is a result of a combination of factors arising 
from the crisis, some of which acted to increase inequality and others to reduce 
it. As discussed below, the bursting of the property market bubble affected those 
at the top of the income distribution, especially those who earned most of their 
income from property related activities. This resulted in a big fall in numbers of 
high earners, reducing income inequality. The massive rise in numbers 
unemployed in the period to 2012 moved a lot of people towards the bottom of 
the income distribution, tending to increase inequality. However, the 
 
1
  These data are based on the latest National Accounts and the current QEC forecast. Personal disposable income is 
forecast taken from this QEC for 2014 (and from the national accounts for 2008) and it is divided by the population 
forecast underlying the QEC to arrive at average personal disposable income per head. If allowance is made for the fall 
in prices over that period the fall in real personal disposable income was around 4 per cent. 
2
  Summary measures of income inequality place differing weights on inequality at different points in the income 
distribution; for this reason it is advisable also to examine changes in income shares for different income groups. 
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maintenance of the welfare floor relatively unchanged3, in spite of the crisis, 
provided significant support for this group of people.  
 
Callan et al., 2013, have carried out a detailed study of the effects of discretionary 
changes in taxation (including indirect taxes), public service pay and welfare 
payments on the distribution of income in Ireland. They have shown how 
discretionary changes in taxes and welfare payments have also modified the 
outcome for different income cohorts. They show that changes in taxes and 
benefits tended to have the biggest negative effect on the top (-15 per cent) and 
bottom deciles (-12.5 per cent) of the income distribution but that all deciles 
suffered a loss of at least 10 per cent in disposable income as a result of 
discretionary changes in taxes, transfers and public service pay.  
 
As discussed in Nolan et al., 2014, EU SILC may not provide a very good 
representation of incomes at the very top of the income distribution and the 
Revenue Commissioners’ data are useful in looking at the numbers of people on 
really high incomes. The Revenue Commissioners’ data for the years 2007 and 
2011 (the latest year available) show that for those earning over €100,000 a year 
there was a very big reduction in both their numbers and their average income 
over that period. The number of taxpayers with incomes over €100,000 fell by 
14.7 per cent between 2007 and 2011 (Table 1). The fall was particularly 
pronounced for the highest income band – those earning over €275,000 – where 
numbers in that income bracket fell by over 28 per cent. In addition, average 
income of those in the highest income bracket also fell by over 15 per cent. As a 
result, total income of those earning over €100,000 fell by 22.6 per cent over the 
four years. 
 
TABLE 1 Revenue Commissioners’ Data, change between 2007 and 2011 
Income Range Number of Taxpayers Average Income Total Income 
100-150 -12.6 -0.3 -12.8 
150-200 -13.0 0.0 -13.0 
200-275 -15.7 -0.2 -15.9 
275+ -28.4 -15.3 -39.4 
100+ -14.7 -9.3 -22.6 
All Taxpayers -13.4 -0.6 -13.9 
 
As those earning over €100,000 paid 46 per cent of all income tax in 2007 (while 
accounting for 25 per cent of income), this very big fall in the numbers of really 
high earners had a major impact on tax revenue. In 2011, in spite of a rise in the 
average tax rate for all taxpayers, the proportion of income tax coming from this 
 
3
 Welfare rates for non-pensioners were cut but prices also fell, helping preserve the real value of payments. 
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group fell to 43 per cent of all income tax. Thus the big fall in numbers of high 
earners meant that more of the burden of income tax had to be carried by those 
on middle incomes. 
 
FIGURE 1  Gini Coefficient before Direct Taxation and Welfare Payments 
 
 
FIGURE 2 Gini Coefficient Including Direct Taxation and Welfare Payments 
 
 
Eurostat shows comparative data on the Gini coefficient for all EU countries using 
a slightly different basis to that used in the CSO publication. However, these data 
have the advantage that they are comparable across countries. Using these data, 
it is interesting to compare the impact of the recession on the distribution of 
income in Ireland compared to that in some other EU countries, and also to 
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consider the impact of public policy, acting through the tax and welfare systems, 
in moderating that change.4 
 
Using the Eurostat data, Figure 1 shows the Gini coefficient for France, Germany, 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the UK, for income before taxation and before 
income from welfare payments. These data reflect the effects of market forces 
affecting pre-tax incomes through changes in employment and wage rates. Figure 
1 shows that there was a significant rise in income inequality measured in this 
way in Ireland, Spain and the UK over the crisis years. Beginning in 2009, 
inequality rose rapidly in Ireland and Spain, peaking in the latest year for which 
data are available, 2012. In the case of Portugal the rise in inequality occurred 
later but was, nonetheless, also very substantial. 
 
Also using Eurostat data for income, Figure 2 shows the Gini coefficient for the 
same range of countries as are covered in Figure 1 after the effects of taxes on 
income and welfare payments are taken into account. In this case the Gini 
coefficient, not surprisingly, is very much lower for all countries, reflecting the 
major redistributive effect of public policy on tax and welfare across the EU. The 
effect of public policy in modifying the distribution of income results from both 
discretionary changes in that policy but also, much more importantly, from the 
“automatic stabilising” effects of existing policy: even if rates of welfare 
payments are held unchanged, with a big increase in numbers unemployed there 
is a big increase in public expenditure on welfare payments. 
 
When allowance is made for the effects of public policy, so defined, it can be seen 
that the pattern of change in the distribution of income over the crisis years is 
now rather different. As discussed above, the effect of public policy in Ireland, 
acting through the tax and welfare systems, has been to produce a significant fall 
in the Gini coefficient in the crisis years 2008-2012, resulting in a more equal 
distribution of income than before the crisis began. A rather similar outcome is 
also shown for Portugal. However, for France the combined effect of the crisis 
and of public policy was to produce an increase in inequality. In Spain the 
increase in inequality in the years after 2008 is quite marked as public policy only 
partly offset the trend in market income shown in Figure 1. For the UK the effect 
of public policy was to leave the distribution of income in 2012 roughly 
unchanged compared to 2007. 
 
 
4
  Here only taxes on income are taken into account whereas Callan, et al., 2013a, take account of changes in other taxes, 
including indirect taxes, capital taxes and property taxes, as well as public service pay and changes in certain other 
services. 
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  Summ er  20 14  |  1 03  
 
 
The Irish experience and that of Portugal stand out as being exceptional; public 
policy more than reversed the effects of market forces on the distribution of 
income, resulting in greater equality in the distribution of income. As shown by 
Callan et al., 2013a, the effects of discretionary changes in public policy made 
only a limited contribution to offsetting the effects of market forces. Instead, it 
was the crucial role of the automatic stabilisers in the tax and welfare systems 
which played a major role in this outcome. 
 
Another indicator of the important role played by the welfare system, in 
promoting an equitable sharing of the burden of adjustment, is the proportion of 
the population who would be at “risk of poverty” if all social transfers were 
excluded. In 2005, before the crisis began, the proportion was 40 per cent of the 
population. However, by 2012 the proportion was over 50 per cent (CSO, EU SILC, 
2012). Thus the role of the welfare system in promoting a more equitable 
distribution of resources has increased substantially because of the crisis. 
 
FIGURE 3  Government Transfers as a Percentage of GNP 
 
 
Maintaining the welfare system largely unchanged, in the face a huge increase in 
numbers depending on the system, imposed a very big burden on the public 
finances. As shown in Figure 3, in 2007 government transfers (social welfare 
payments) amounted to 13 per cent of GNP. However, with the more than 
trebling in the numbers of unemployed, the bill for transfers rose to 20 per cent 
of GNP by 2011. While it has now fallen back to around 17 per cent of GNP, with 
the fall in the numbers unemployed, this is still far above the level of the boom 
years. The need to fund this increase in welfare payments massively increased 
the problems with the public finances in the period 2008-2011. Already there 
needed to be a very big increase in taxation and dramatic cuts in expenditure to 
eliminate the very large deficit. To make room for the increased welfare bill the 
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cuts in other areas of expenditure and the increases in taxation had to be even 
greater. 
 
While the welfare system has played an important role in providing protection for 
those at the bottom of the income distribution, including those who lost their 
jobs during the recession, there is also a significant number of people in lower to 
middle income deciles who are suffering financial distress (Maître, Russell, and 
Whelan, 2014). This arises because of the housing crisis which has left a 
significant share of the population aged between 35 and 50 heavily indebted. As a 
result, some of these households are suffering from very high outgoings on their 
mortgages. Their financial distress is not picked up by the Gini coefficient. 
 
Conclusions 
The years since the bursting of the property bubble have involved an 
exceptionally painful adjustment process affecting all of the population. However, 
the fiscal policy options chosen by successive governments have contributed to 
an outcome where inequality in the distribution of income has fallen over the last 
five years. A major factor in ensuring this outcome was the maintenance of the 
welfare system, broadly unchanged, in the face of the massive increase in 
numbers depending on it. The need for increased taxes and for cuts elsewhere in 
the economy was greatly increased by the decision of successive governments to 
protect those on low incomes who were dependent on the welfare system. This 
policy choice was different from that adopted in many other EU countries, where 
income inequality increased significantly as a result of the crisis.  
 
Even with increases in tax rates on high incomes, because of the heavy attrition 
among the cohort of high earners and the major reduction in the numbers 
employed throughout the economy, the bulk of the burden of increases in 
taxation had to be carried by those on middle incomes who were still in 
employment.  
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